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PREFACE 
Like many freshmen, I came to Michigan with a plan. I would study Linguistics, intern at 
law firms throughout undergrad, and position myself for a life in the legal field. It was in this frame 
of mind that I signed up to take Intro to World Politics with Professor Koremenos. Immediately, 
the subject of international politics and law piqued my interest, especially in how it necessitated a 
historical understanding (what happened?) as well as a methodical one (why did it happen and how 
can we recreate or prevent something similar?). However, it was especially the lectures on human 
rights that held my attention. 
I came to better understand how the very idea of human rights has made an immense impact 
on our world. Despite its frequent framing as a naive concept, the language of human rights has 
shaped contemporary international law and motivated revolutions as well as transnational 
compassion and advocacy. My fascination with the considerable power of human rights has 
continued to shape my undergraduate career. In addition to motivating my decision to declare a 
major in Political Science, it has also led to my desire to minor in Moral and Political Philosophy 
as well as to be more aware of human rights abuses when and where they occur. And, of course, it 
has also led me here, to a thesis dedicated not only to my research question but to highlighting the 
power of human rights as illustrated through the Inter-American Human Rights System.  
Though the great majority of my thesis, through the many twists and turns of the research 
process, focuses on U.S. foreign policy, it was the Inter-American System itself that I fell in love 
with. Both because it goes beyond declaring mere ideas of basic human rights by attempting to 
enforce them but also because, when it fails in this endeavor, it does at least succeed in calling 
attention to abuses themselves; and, in doing so, it works to recognize and validate the experiences 
of victims of human rights abuses. 
This is a powerful thing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States has considered itself a leader in human rights.1 There is certainly some 
truth to this; its founding as a nation is remembered by the oft-quoted words, “We hold these truths 
to be self-evident, that all men are created equal.” It has also participated actively in the 
development of the international human rights regime, negotiating agreements such as the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women, and many others.2 Yet, its participation in the negotiation of such agreements 
fails to translate to a record of ratifying human rights instruments. When agreements have been 
ratified, as is the case with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
Genocide Convention, the road is a long one between the agreements’ conclusion and the United 
States’ ratification.3 
The question that naturally follows from this observation is why the United States has 
failed to ratify multiple human rights agreements. Indeed, both nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) and scholars have considered this puzzling question. NGOs point out the impact of the 
United States’ cold feet with regards to human rights: mainly, that, by not ratifying agreements, 
the United States’ credibility as a leader of human rights is called into question.4 In Amnesty 
International’s 2019 report on the human rights situation in the United States, they point out that, 
                                                
1 In the recent words of current Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, “Since America’s founding, the 
concept of individual rights has been woven into the national fabric… every year since 1977, the State 
Department has, through this report, put the world on notice that we’ll expose violation of human rights 
wherever they occur. We have told those who disgrace the concept of human dignity they will pay a price, 
that their abuses will be meticulously documented and then publicized.” See Pompeo 2019. 
2 Cohen 2006. 
3 In the case of the ICCPR, twenty six years separate the covenant’s conclusion and the United States 
ratification. The Genocide Convention is even more surprising, with forty years having elapsed between 
the agreement’s conclusion in 1948 and the United States’ ratification in 1988.  
4 See Wilken 2017 (writing for human rights NGO, Global Justice Center) and the Human Rights Watch 
2009 Report titled, “United States Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties.” 
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by not fully participating in international human rights, the U.S. effectively “[declines] to 
cooperate with [the] examination of the human rights situation within the USA.”5 
While NGOs consider the impact, scholars contemplate the cause of the United States’ 
failure to ratify human rights agreements. Most scholarly work emphasizes the role of sovereignty 
and federalism concerns, tracing these concerns to the proposal of the Bricker Amendment in the 
1950s.6 The Bricker Amendment was a proposed amendment to the Constitution, put forward by 
Republican Senator from Ohio, John Bricker from 1951-1954. The amendment would have 
rendered all international human rights agreements non-self-executing, meaning that agreements 
would not be domestically enforceable without additional legislation which, in turn, would limit 
the impact of agreement ratification. Although the amendment failed by one vote in the Senate, 
scholars argue that the effects of its consideration have been long-lasting, causing a persistence of 
concern over how human rights agreements might override U.S. sovereignty. It is therefore the 
Bricker Amendment, they argue, that has led to the United States’ failure to ratify human rights 
agreements. 
In the particular case of the American Convention on Human Rights, scholars have also 
proposed that the Convention carries substantive barriers for the United States.7 Scholars 
advancing this argument identify that the United States may have failed to ratify the American 
Convention because the Convention was not sufficiently consistent with U.S. domestic law, 
especially in terms of its right to life language which can be read as prohibiting abortion. Because 
abortion is permitted in the United States and because the Convention additionally prohibits the 
                                                
5 See Amnesty International 2019 Report. 
6 Bitker 1981, Hevener Kaufman and Whiteman 1988, Henkin 1995, Diab 1992, and Rivera Jurasti 2013. 
7 See Chapter Three for more details on inconsistencies between the right to life as it is understood in the 
United States as compared to the American Convention. In short, the American Convention can be read as 
prohibiting abortion, which is permitted in the United States, and restricts the application of the death 
penalty in ways that do not align with U.S. domestic laws. 
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death penalty in cases where the United States allows it, the U.S. is argued to have avoided the 
inconsistency by not ratifying. In Chapter Three of this thesis, I discuss the limitations of both the 
Bricker Amendment Argument and Substantive Limitations Argument in detail. 
However, one limitation facing both of the arguments is that, in asking only why the United 
States fails to ratify, scholars miss the most interesting characteristic of the United States’ 
engagement with international human rights law: that it is uneven. While the United States exerts 
time, energy, and resources into negotiating many human rights agreements, it often falls short of 
ratifying them. The current explanations in the literature often acknowledge this phenomenon, but 
scholarship has not attempted to explain it or study it empirically. By failing to address this aspect 
of the United States’ relationship to human rights, their explanation for the United States’ failure 
to ratify is incomplete. 
This thesis seeks to remedy this gap by investigating the United States’ uneven engagement 
with the American Convention on Human Rights. I propose that uneven engagement is a result of 
the tension between two approaches to norm exportation. These approaches — the Restraint 
Approach and Imposition Approach — fundamentally disagree about how the United States should 
promote human rights abroad. The Restraint Approach endorses U.S. participation in international 
institutions, restraining some power in order to influence the institutions themselves. Conversely, 
the Imposition Approach avoids participation in such institutions to preserve U.S. sovereignty, 
opting instead for unilateral condemnations or interventions when necessary. The presence of both 
these perspectives, I argue, gives rise to what attorney Bruno Bitker calls the “split personality” of 
the United States’ human rights involvement.8 
                                                
8 Bitker 1981, 90. 
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To test the presence of these approaches and understand their tension’s role in preventing 
human rights ratification by the United States, I use process tracing to evaluate several documents, 
including the Convention’s preparatory documents, primary and secondary sources detailing the 
League of Nations membership debate,9 and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s hearing 
considering the ratification of the American Convention.10 These sources lend insight on the 
predicted implications of each hypothesis developed throughout Chapters Three and Four of this 
thesis. 
The thesis will proceed as follows: Chapter One will briefly describe the structure of the 
Inter-American Human Rights System, including an overview of the agreements and monitoring 
and punishment system that comprise it. Chapter Two will detail the theoretical sources of the 
Restraint and Imposition Approaches before I argue for the utility of their application in 
considering the United States’ uneven engagement in the American Convention. I then, in Chapter 
Three, review the two main alternative explanations in the literature — the Substantive Limitations 
Argument and the Bricker Amendment Argument — for why the United States has failed to ratify 
the American Convention. In doing so, I articulate hypotheses for both explanations as well as 
testable implications for them. 
Chapter Four summarizes my methodology, describing the fundamentals of process 
tracing, the qualitative tests the method uses to evaluate evidence, and how I apply those tests in 
light of my hypotheses. Lastly, Chapter Five reports the results of my analysis of several primary 
and secondary source documents, highlighting the qualitative data collected and discussing it. I 
ultimately conclude that neither the Substantive Limitations or Bricker Amendment Arguments 
                                                
9 These documents are used to test the validity of the Bricker Amendment Argument. See Chapter Three. 
10 I use process tracing methods as developed by Collier and Beach and Pederson. See Collier 2011 and 
Beach and Pederson 2013. 
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are substantiated. Additionally, I find some support for my argument that uneven engagement 
results from a tension between Restraint and Imposition Approaches to human rights and suggest 
that further study may help understand the possible general applicability of this proposition.  
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Chapter One 
BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE OF THE 
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 
 
Before engaging with my positive argument or the existing literature on the United States’ 
participation in the Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS), it is necessary to first 
establish an understanding of the System itself: its structure and workings as well as its relevant 
actors. This chapter seeks to answer the question, what does it imply for states to ratify the 
American Convention on Human Rights? More broadly, what does membership in the 
Organization of American States imply for states? I answer these questions by highlighting the 
major agreements and bodies of the System, their functions, their interconnectedness, and who can 
access them. 
Major Agreements of the IAHRS 
 The Organization of American States (OAS) was established in April 1948 with the signing 
of the OAS Charter11 by 21 Western hemispheric countries, including the United States. 
Reaffirming the important mission of the United Nations, the Charter also recognized the desire 
and need for “American solidarity and good neighborliness” and “intensive continental 
cooperation” for the purpose of individual and hemispheric welfare.12 During the same conference, 
states also signed the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man,13 providing the broad 
                                                
11 Entered into force in December 1951. 
12 Charter of the Organization of American States 1948, Preamble. 
13 Many scholars have noted the importance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
adopted in December 1948, even highlighting its role in propelling the landscape of human rights forward 
(Nickel 1987 and Donnelly and Whelan 2018). Interestingly, however, the lesser-known American 
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strokes of the human rights mission of the OAS, establishing the beginnings of the Inter-American 
Human Rights System, and framing the later drafting of the American Convention on Human 
Rights.14 
 The American Convention, drafted and negotiated between 1959 and 1969, was finally 
signed in November 1969 and entered into force in 1978. Establishing the Convention gave more 
shape and substance to the early Inter-American System, grounding the ideals of the American 
Declaration in a legally binding document. In addition to its substantive provisions, the American 
Convention also further defined the role of the existing Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights as well as established the new Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Both these bodies, 
working together, are tasked with monitoring the human rights situation in the Americas and 
punishing human rights abuses occurring in the Western hemisphere. 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“the Commission”) was established 
in 1959, before the American Convention was signed or entered into force. As of 1961, the 
Commission had conducted country visits to OAS member states, assessing their human rights 
practices and monitoring areas where there were concerns.15 Since then, the responsibilities and 
mandate of the Commission have expanded. Seven Commissioners, each from an OAS member 
state, are tasked with carrying out the three pillars of the Commission’s work: hearing petitions 
                                                
Declaration predates the UDHR by eight months and is widely considered the first international human 
rights agreement (Farer 1997 and Sikkink 2014). 
14 American Convention on Human Rights 1979, Preamble. 
15 The Commission’s earliest work included country visits to Cuba, investigating the treatment of political 
prisoners, and the Dominican Republic, investigating forced disappearances and killings of political 
prisoners and protestors. See Reports of the Inter-American Commission, available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/pais.eng.htm.  
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that allege human rights violations, broadly monitoring the human rights practices of member 
states, and assessing the status of certain “thematic areas” of human rights such as racial justice or 
indigenous rights.16 In particular, the first pillar, the Commission’s work of hearing petitions, may 
have different consequences depending on which OAS human rights agreement(s) a state is party 
to. 
Under the Rules of Procedure for the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the 
Commission may hear petitions from both citizens and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
so long as they are legally recognized in at least one of the OAS member states. These petitions 
are allegations of human rights abuses against an OAS member state and provide a rare access 
point for non-state actors to remedy abuses made against them or against who they represent. 
However, the nature of these allegations changes depending on whether the respondent state is a 
member of the American Convention. For states not party to the Convention, the allegations may 
only be made on the basis of rights protected by the American Declaration. The Commission may 
then, if it finds a violation, issue recommendations to the state and require a report from the state 
regarding its adherence to the recommended measures.17 For individuals whose rights are violated 
by a country not party to the American Convention, this is the extent of the measures available to 
them through the Inter-American Human Rights System. However, for those whose state is a 
member of the American Convention, there may be additional remedies possible through the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights.18 
                                                
16 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “What is the IACHR?” Available at 
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/what.asp 
17 Rules and Procedures of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Article 44. 
18 States must indicate they accept the contentious jurisdiction of the Court, although the majority of states 
who ratify do so. Of the twenty-five states party to the Convention, only six do not: Dominica, Grenada, 
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. 
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The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) was created by the American 
Convention19 in 1969 and formally established in 1979. Seven judges sit on the Court and are 
nominated and elected by member states of the Convention, though the judges may be from any 
OAS member state.20 Those who submit petitions to the Commission against states party to the 
American Convention may have their petitions transmitted to the Court, providing the possibility 
for additional legal processes and remedies for abuses. These include the possibility for binding 
decisions to be made by the Court upon American Convention member states with regard to human 
rights abuses. The decisions can include both pecuniary and nonpecuniary punishments or 
reparations, which range from larger settlements for families or victims to public apologies or 
monuments. 
 The ability of the Commission to transmit petitions to the Court implies something unique 
about the Inter-American System: that individuals and NGOs may take their own countries to an 
international court for human rights abuses committed against them. In addition to this feature, 
allegations against states party to the American Convention may include provisions of the 
Convention itself, which outline more precise rights than the American Declaration and hold 
member states to a more rigorous standard.21 For example, while the American Declaration loosely 
                                                
19 American Convention on Human Rights, Chapter 8. 
20 American Convention on Human Rights, Articles 52-53. 
21 Likewise, though less relevant to this thesis, allegations may include rights enumerated in other OAS 
human rights agreements, so long as the respondent state has ratified the agreement. This has been 
especially meaningful in femicide cases or, broadly, cases of violence against women, which can draw on 
the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against 
Women (also known as the Convention of Belém do Pará). 
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protects the “right to establish a family,” the American Convention is more specific, enumerating 
the right to marriage as a component of one’s right to family.22  
Notably, since the Court first began hearing cases in 1987, it has only had cases from 
individual citizens or NGOs submitted to it, even though a member state may itself submit a case 
against another state to the Court.23 Likely the incentives to individuals and NGOs to bring cases 
to the Commission — and, if needed, the Court — are vastly different than the incentives of other 
countries to do the same. States themselves must continuously consider how their actions in some 
areas might affect their relationships with states in other areas. 
For example, consider the case where State A notices a human rights violation committed 
by State B. State A may feel very strongly that the actions committed by State B were wrong; if 
both states are members of the American Convention, State A may submit a case to the Inter-
American Court against State B. However, State A’s considerations do not extend simply to the 
context of the case it would like to bring to the Court. State A must consider all areas it cooperates 
or interacts with State B and weigh the benefits of bringing a case to the Court against the possible 
consequences in these other realms of cooperation. State A may win the case, proving a human 
rights violation by State B, but it may suffer, for example, consequences in its trade relations with 
B due to B’s retaliation. 
For individuals and NGOs, however, the incentives are much more in their favor in 
bringing petitions to the Commission that may make their way to the Court. They do not have the 
same concerns over staying in the “good graces” of the countries they bring petitions against, and 
they may see reparations for — or at the very least, recognition of — the wrongs made against 
                                                
22 See Article 6 of the American Declaration and Article 17 of the American Convention. 
23 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, “Decisions and Judgements,” available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/cf/Jurisprudencia2/busqueda_casos_contenciosos.cfm?lang=en 
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them. Therefore, by formalizing a place for individual and NGO involvement in the monitoring 
and punishment of human rights, the Inter-American System overcomes one difficult question 
raised by international human rights law: who punishes? By overcoming the inhibitions of states 
to enforce human rights, the Inter-American System opens the doors for its human rights 
agreements to be more instrumental and tangible than they otherwise would be. 
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Chapter Three 
THE RESTRAINT APPROACH AND THE 
IMPOSITION APPROACH 
 
In this chapter, I argue that the United States’ uneven engagement with the American 
Convention on Human Rights is best understood as a tension between two norm exportation 
approaches: the Restraint Approach and Imposition Approach. In order to do so, I first define each 
approach by drawing on the work of theorist Georg Sørensen, whose articulation of a “liberalism 
of restraint” and “liberalism of imposition” largely inform this research.24 I then further give 
meaning to these approaches by applying them to the context of human rights and, in doing so, 
make predictions about what I will observe in Senate considerations of the American Convention 
if my argument were to hold true. 
A Liberal Disagreement 
Before defining the Restraint and Imposition Approaches as I apply them in this thesis, an 
understanding of their theoretical source is necessary. Liberal theory has long grappled with the 
tension between negative liberty and positive liberty in how states should be permitted to regulate 
or interfere with their citizens.25 One is said to be free in a negative sense when she is not subject 
to intervention by another person or entity. Although liberal theorists disagree over what 
constitutes justified intervention, there is general agreement over the principle that individuals 
                                                
24 Georg Sørensen, 2006, “Liberalism of Restraint and Liberalism of Imposition: Liberal Values and 
World Order in the New Millennium,” International Relations 20(3): 251-272. 
25 Berlin 1969. 
TILLOTSON 
18 
should retain some minimum standard of freedom to do, say, and think as they please.26 However, 
many theorists also endorse the idea of positive liberty: the freedom to be one’s “own master,” free 
from “external forces of whatever kind” that limit one’s decisions.27 This is distinct from negative 
liberty because the protection of positive liberty often involves positive action by the state. 
Examples of positive liberty exerted domestically may include affirmative action policies or 
welfare benefits. Because securing positive liberty often requires infringements on negative 
liberty, the two are in tension with one another, and disagreements over the correct balancing of 
the two abound in domestic politics.28 
Sørensen applies these theoretically established types of freedom to the international realm, 
arguing that the same tension exists for liberal states as they consider how to pursue a liberal world 
order.29 He proposes “liberalism of restraint” and “liberalism of imposition” as two competing 
methods for pursuing a more free global society. The liberalism of restraint is based in the negative 
liberty concept; that is, that people — and states — should be free from interference save in 
                                                
26For example, Millian theorists argue that intervention is justified only to prevent individuals from 
harming others. Others, like Peter de Marneffe, offer that paternalism — intervention to prevent 
individuals from harming themselves — is justified. 
27 Berlin 1969, 22. 
28 Positive liberty and negative liberty also largely inform the idea of first-generation and second-
generation human rights. First-generation rights include political and civil rights, such as the right to vote 
and freedom of speech. Second-generation rights, on the other hand, are social, cultural, and economic 
rights, such as the right to health care or the right to housing. In the coming paragraphs, it is important to 
avoid  conflating these with the two forms of liberalism Sørensen proposes, despite their common 
theoretical origins. Although a state actor may identify herself with liberalism of imposition (based is 
positive liberty) in terms of state norm exportation, preferring intervention over institutional cooperation, 
she may also be apprehensive towards second-generation human rights (also based in positive liberty). 
The two need not go hand-in-hand, despite common origins. 
29 Although not of central importance to this thesis, it is interesting to consider that, despite its frequent 
usage as a term in international political theory literature, a common understanding of a ‘world order’ is 
rather elusive. For example, while some scholars characterize a “world order” as an entirely nation-state 
based system, others distinguish between a “world order” and an “international order,” where the world 
order is inclusive of non-state actors. See Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006 for the state-based perspective 
and Kacowicz 2012 for the inclusive perspective. 
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exceptional cases.30 Conversely, liberalism of imposition draws on positive liberty, taking the view 
that intervention is justified “to secure the proper conditions for real freedom.”31 The implication, 
however, is that those states in a position to intervene and ensure such conditions have already 
secured the conditions for themselves and, thus, are not justified in being intervened upon. I aim 
to test, empirically, the tension that Sørensen identifies at the international law level, identifying 
whether the debate between restraint and imposition is at work in considering human rights 
agreements. 
The theoretical clarity of Sørensen’s articulation of restraint and imposition motivates my 
use of his nomenclature; however, other scholars have also noted the divide Sørensen identifies. 
Political scientist Henry Nau differentiates between traditions of U.S. foreign policy, including 
Liberal Internationalists and Conservative Internationalists.32 Reminiscent of Sørensen’s 
liberalism of restraint, Nau describes Liberal Internationalists as those who see participation in 
international institutions, by all nations, as the best method of encouraging the “liberal or 
                                                
30 Sørensen 2006, 258. See Berlin 1969 for the theoretical foundations Sørensen draws on for his 
distinction between negative and positive liberty. 
31 Sørensen 2006, 259. 
32 Henry Nau, 2017, “America’s Foreign Policy Traditions,” in The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National 
Security. Nau identifies, in addition to Liberal and Conservative Internationalism, two other perspectives: 
Isolationism/Nationalism and Realism. Isolationists/Nationalists are characterized by their focus inward, 
avoiding international interaction. Realists are characterized by a desire to maintain U.S. power relative to 
other states. I do not examine these two traditions deeply in this thesis for two reasons. First, as Nau 
asserts, the two traditions are much more security-focused while the forms of Internationalism consider 
how we should spread liberal and democratic values. Second, while Nau defines them separately, it is 
unconvincing that the characteristics of the security-focused traditions and foreign policy-focused 
traditions necessarily be mutually exclusive. Take, for example, President Teddy Roosevelt, who Nau 
classifies as a Realist. On one hand, Roosevelt used intervention to “establish America’s credentials” 
relative to the rest of the world (a Realist characteristic). But, he also established the Roosevelt Corollary 
to the Monroe Doctrine, asserting the ‘right’ of the United States to be an “international police power” 
and intervene in Latin America in cases of “chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a 
general loosening of the ties of civilized society.” This assertion appears to more closely reflect 
Conservative Internationalism. Because of these blurred boundaries, I choose to proceed with the two 
forms of Internationalism as they are supported elsewhere in the literature. 
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republican experiment” across the world.33 Liberal Internationalists additionally only endorse the 
use of force — positive intervention — as a final resort in extreme cases, such as invasion. 
Reflecting liberalism of imposition logic are the Conservative Internationalists. They rely on 
unilateral militarism to “spread norms of compromise, pluralism, democracy, human rights, and 
the rule of law,” privileging the preservation of U.S. national sovereignty and avoiding 
“[surrender] to international institutions.”34 
Historian Thomas Knock also identifies two foreign policy camps within the particular 
context of the League of Nations35 proposal, referring to them as Progressive Internationalists and 
Conservative Internationalists.36 His characterization of the two ideologies runs parallel to Nau’s 
and Sørensen’s, with Progressive Internationalists, including President Woodrow Wilson, 
advocating for participation in international institutions and the self-determination of nations. 
Conservative Internationalists of the time saw the agenda of Progressive Internationalists as a 
“diminution of national sovereignty,” preferring to maintain the “right to undertake independent 
coercive action.”37 Sørensen’s, Nau’s, and Knock’s articulations of two foreign policy orientations 
are summarized below: 
 
 
 
 
                                                
33 Nau 2017, 9. 
34 Nau 2017, 10. 
35 I later use the case of the League of Nations as evidence against the Bricker Amendment Argument 
articulated in Chapter Three. See Chapter Five. 
36 Thomas Knock, 2008, “Playing for a Hundred Years Hence,” in The Crisis of American Foriegn 
Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century, Princeton University Press. 
37 Knock 2008, 31. 
LEADER OF RIGHTS? 
21 
 Restraint Approach Imposition Approach 
Sørensen Liberalism of restraint: Respecting 
inherent freedom of states from 
intervention and seeking to norm export 
through cooperative international 
institutions. 
Liberalism of imposition: Prioritizing 
autonomy and avoiding international 
institutional cooperation. Norm 
exportation occurs through unilateral 
condemnations and intervention. 
Nau Liberal Internationalists: View 
international institutions as the best arena 
for spreading liberal values. Endorse 
force only in a last-case scenario, such as 
foreign invasion. 
Conservative Internationalists: View 
unilateral intervention as the best 
method for spreading liberal values. 
Avoid surrender of sovereignty to 
international institutions. 
Knock Progressive Internationalists: Values the 
self-determination of nations and 
therefore seeks cooperation through 
international institutions. 
Conservative Internationalists: Value 
sovereignty and maintaining the right 
to intervention, if desired.  
 Table 1. Comparing competing foreign policy approaches. 
 
The tension between these norm exportation approaches is useful in explaining the United 
States’ engagement with the American Convention because it can address the uneven nature of 
U.S. engagement. That is, it can go beyond explaining the United States’ mere failure to ratify the 
American Convention, as the two alternative explanations I identify in the next chapter have 
attempted. Instead, this framework also considers why the U.S. actively participated in the 
Convention’s creation or considered ratifying it at all. Because it explains both elements of the 
United States’ confusing international human rights record, and not only the end result of a failure 
to ratify, the Restraint-Imposition tension may also be generalizable to other instances of uneven 
U.S. engagement in human rights. Given this logic, the following hypothesis arises: 
 
H1: The United States’ uneven engagement (participation in negotiation but failure to 
ratify) with the American Convention on Human Rights is a symptom of the tension 
between the Restraint Approach and Imposition Approach to norm exportation. 
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Now, with an understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of the Restraint and 
Imposition Approaches within traditional liberal theory, I will briefly summarize the main 
characteristics of each approach and articulate some predictions about how these approaches might 
manifest in U.S. consideration of the American Convention on Human Rights. 
The Restraint Approach 
Because the Restraint Approach is based on the concept of negative liberty, actors who 
hold this approach do not, as a general rule, endorse unilateral interventions for the promotion or 
protection of human rights. Instead, the Restraint Approach seeks opportunities for building and 
participating in international institutions with the aim of exporting human rights norms through 
U.S. influence in the institution.38 It may appear counterintuitive for this approach to be labeled  
as one of restraint, given that it actually encourages active participation. However, it is restraining 
in the sense that participation in international institutions regulates states’ future decision-making 
in accordance with the international legal commitments they make. Those who argue from the 
Restraint Approach will nevertheless see the value in allowing for some restraint in order to exert 
influence and leadership in the institution itself. 
Therefore, if H1 is true, that the U.S.’s uneven engagement with the American Convention 
results from a tension between Restraint and Imposition approaches, we would expect support of 
Convention ratification in the Senate to reflect the logic of the Restraint Approach. For example, 
we would expect supporters of ratification to make statements such as, “Ratifying the American 
Convention on Human Rights will allow the United States greater influence in the activity of the 
Inter-American System” or “Participating in the American Convention will make our human rights 
                                                
38 Sørensen 2006, 260. 
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recommendations more credible/authoritative in Latin America.” These statements reflect 
Restraint Approach logic because they claim that participating in the American Convention will 
improve the United States’ ability to promote human rights norms. 
The opposite is also true; negative statements that point out what the United States misses 
out on by not ratifying, according to Restraint Approach logic, would also provide support for H1. 
Therefore, we might expect statements such as, “By not ratifying the American Convention, we 
forfeit the possibility of recommending American judges to the Inter-American Court” or “Our 
commitment to human rights may be less credible/questioned if we do not ratify the Convention, 
reducing the impact of our human rights recommendations.” 
The Imposition Approach 
 Recalling that the Imposition Approach is based on the promotion of positive liberty, actors 
who affirm this view would prefer unilateral condemnations or occasional unilateral intervention 
to ensure human rights over what they might view as the Restraint Approach’s “[surrender] to 
international institutions.”39 In other words, this perspective of norm exportation seeks for the 
United States to impose its norms in cases where states are not upholding sufficient human rights 
practices and rejects the limitations to sovereignty that may result from being tied to international 
human rights. 
It may appear hypocritical to justify U.S. intervention but reject scrutiny from other states. 
However, though the Imposition Approach justifies unilateral U.S. intervention, it does so only 
insofar as is necessary “to secure the proper conditions for real freedom,” explaining why U.S. 
                                                
39 Nau 2017, 10. 
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intervention in human rights practices of other liberal states is rarely observed.40 This also explains 
the Imposition Approach’s rejection of the scrutiny or intervention of other states; those coming 
from the Imposition perspective likely view the United States as already having obtained the rights 
and conditions necessary for freedom. In this sense, the Imposition Approach, though justifying 
intervention in U.S. foreign policy when necessary, is also characterized by isolationism. The 
United States’ own sovereignty should not be imposed upon because, under the Imposition 
Approach, there is no reason or justification for such intervention. As we will see in the next 
chapter, the concerns raised by the Bricker Amendment fit well into the perspective of the 
Imposition Approach. This is another reason that the Restraint-Imposition tension appears to be a 
more comprehensive framework for the United States uneven human rights engagement, 
especially in light of this tension potentially existing prior to the Bricker Amendment.41 
 If H1 were true, we would expect opposition to ratifying the Convention to be voiced in 
terms of the isolationist logic of the Imposition Approach. The isolationism of the Imposition 
Approach may be more salient than interventionist language in considering ratification of the 
American Convention because there is active consideration of binding the United States to an 
international agreement. In this sense, those holding the Imposition Approach will be on the 
defensive, explaining why ratification — and thus opening the U.S. to external opinions on its 
                                                
40 Sørensen 2006, 259. Of course, what is considered a necessary intervention is of great contention, and 
not all those who would fall under the ideological category of the Imposition Approach would likely 
agree as to what constitutes necessary intervention to ensure “real freedom.” This indicates that there may 
be a great deal of diversity within both the Restraint and Imposition Approaches. This thesis aims to 
empirically test the presence of these approaches in consideration of the American Convention on Human 
Rights; however, future work may be interested in refining the understanding of these approaches by 
considering what may be diverse within them. 
41 See both Nau 2017 and Knock 2008 for examples of the Restraint Approach and Imposition Approach 
at work and in competition prior to the 1950s, when the Bricker Amendment was introduced. Also, see 
Tananbaum 1985, which describes how the Bricker Amendment (a possible representation of the 
Imposition Approach) served as a response to President Franklin Roosevelt’s tendency towards 
international cooperation (a Restraint Approach). This possibility is tested in Chapter 5. 
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domestic rights practices — is not justified. For example, we would expect statements such as, 
“The United States should not ratify the American Convention as it may lead to international 
intervention in our domestic policies” or “Ratifying the American Convention would open the 
United States to undue criticism” or “Ratifying the American Convention would negate the status 
of human rights as a domestic issue of the United States.” 
 Additionally, we might expect arguments that refute claims of greater U.S. influence 
through participating in the Convention, responding to the Restraint Approach position. For 
example, statements of the following nature: “The United States need not ratify the American 
Convention as it already can exert influence over human rights in Latin America” or “Ratifying 
the American Convention affords us no greater ability to enforce human rights abroad.” 
 Lastly, if H1 is true, I expect to observe statements expressing concern over the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, given the great amount of power afforded it. This expectation 
is especially relevant in light of the access NGOs and individuals have to the Court, which makes 
it more likely that the U.S. would have cases against it than if only American Convention member 
states had access.42 These statements may look like, “The Inter-American Court is of particular 
concern as the United States may need to respond to cases.” These expectations, both for the 
manifestation of the Restraint Approach and the Imposition Approach, are summarized in Table 2 
below.43 
 
 
 
 
                                                
42 See section titled “The Inter-American Court of Human Rights” in Chapter One of this thesis. 
43 See Appendix A for a summary table including the predicted implications for all three hypotheses. 
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Hypothesis and 
Predicted 
Implication 
Evidence Type 
H1.a.i Statements claiming that participation in the American Convention will 
improve the United States’ ability to promote human rights norms. 
H1.a.ii Statements claiming the United States will miss out on the opportunity to 
influence the protection and practice of human rights by not ratifying the 
American Convention. 
H1.b.i Statements claiming that participating in the American Convention will open 
the United States to unnecessary or unwanted intervention. 
H1.b.ii Statements claiming that ratifying the Convention will not increase U.S. 
influence in human rights beyond what it already is. 
H1.b.iii Statements expressing concern over the possibility of the U.S. being taken to 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
 Table 2. Predicted implications given H1 is true.  
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Chapter Three 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
Having established the grounds for investigating the existence and effect of the Restraint-
Imposition tension in the United States’ uneven engagement in the American Convention, I now 
turn to reviewing and assessing some available answers to the question. Two have stood out in the 
literature: the Substantive Limitations Argument and the Bricker Amendment Argument. It is 
important to keep in mind that scholars who have advanced either argument have been aiming to 
answer the more narrow question of why the United States has failed to ratify the American 
Convention. Because this is the case, my testable expectations revolve around the failure to ratify. 
However, I additionally predict what it might look like for Substantive Limitations or the Bricker 
Amendment to be the source of unevenness. I do so expecting that there will likely be little 
evidence of this; however, it would be misguided to assume a priori that, because these 
explanations focus on the failure to ratify, they cannot also explain unevenness. 
The Substantive Limitations Argument 
The Substantive Limitations Argument postulates that the United States has abstained from 
ratifying the American Convention given substantive inconsistencies between the Convention and 
the U.S. domestic legal landscape.44 Substantive provisions of an international agreement include 
behavioral prescriptions and proscriptions — the “thou shalts” and “thou shalt nots” — that states 
then agree to abide by upon ratifying international law. The Substantive Limitations Argument, 
then, says that the thou shalts and thou shalt nots of the American Convention differ from that of 
                                                
44 Diab 1992 and Rivera Juaristi 2013. 
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U.S. domestic law, which inhibits the United States’ ability or desire to ratify. This argument is 
represented by H2: 
 
H2: The U.S.’s uneven engagement with the American Convention on Human Rights is 
due to substantive limitations, especially Article 4, that are inconsistent with the U.S.’s 
domestic law. 
 
Although this argument, as it is presented in existing literature, tends to specify the 
American Convention’s Article 4,45 I will first discuss the general consistency between the 
Convention and U.S. domestic law before addressing the specific culprit article. As described in 
Chapter One of this thesis, the Convention stands out procedurally from other human rights 
agreements. However, its substantive provisions are not entirely revolutionary relative to U.S. 
domestic law. Many of the Convention's provisions, which enumerate the Right to Privacy, 
Freedom of Thought and Expression, Right to Equal Protection, and many others, are foundational 
to U.S. law.46 Likewise, many of these rights, though articulated less precisely than in the 
American Convention, are also included in the American Declaration that the United States had 
already signed on to as of 1948. As it stands, the American Convention appears well aligned with 
existing U.S. human rights norms. 
However, human rights law rarely represents any one state’s perfect preferences. Rather, 
it features a compromise across the relevant actors such that the final agreement is sufficiently 
compatible with the preferences and interests of states involved. For substantive provisions of 
                                                
45 Article 4 of the American Convention details the right to life. In its text, it allows that, “Every person 
has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the 
moment of conception.” This articulation of the right to life is problematic for the United States because 
of its domestic permissibility of abortion. This is described in more detail later in this section. 
46 These rights are provided for in Articles 11, 13, & 24 of the American Convention and correspond to 
rights enumerated in the United States Constitution. In particular, the 4th Amendment, 1st Amendment, 
and 14th Amendment (section 1), respectively. 
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human rights agreements, one manifestation of such compromise is flexibility or imprecision of 
language, which allows states to interpret provisions such that they fit the state’s standard 
regarding a particular norm.47 For example, if State A and State B generally agree that children 
have a right to accessible education, they may still disagree over what constitutes a child and, 
therefore, what the cutoff age should be for access to education. State A may feel 18 is an 
appropriate age, while State B only provides accessible education until the age of 14. Both states 
may still cooperate in an agreement that enumerates the right to education by using flexible or 
vague language, omitting an age cutoff altogether and leaving states themselves to dictate what 
constitutes a “child.”48 
 
Figure 1. Flexible language to overcome somewhat differing norms/preferences.49 
 
In the American Convention, cooperation in light of substantive disagreement is perhaps 
most clearly illustrated by its fourth article. Article 4, concerning the right to life, was controversial 
throughout the drafting process given states’ differences in terms of the domestic legal 
                                                
47 Koremenos 2016, 170-171. 
48 This example is adapted from the logic outlined in Koremenos 2016; see pages 170-171. 
49 This figure is adapted from Koremenos 2016, 172 to include the details of the above example. 
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permissibility of abortion and the death penalty.50 At the time, some states allowed legal access to 
abortion, though oftentimes partial or conditioned access, while others fully banned access to 
abortion.51 Yet, all states agreed that some form of the right to life should be included in the 
Convention. In order to be suitable for states across the spectrum of preference, states included 
more flexible language in Article 4, stating that the right to life should be legally protected “in 
general, from the moment of conception.”52 
By qualifying, with the words “in general,” the assertion that the right to life should be 
legally protected, the Convention remains flexible enough to include non-abortion permitting 
states, who would prefer the right to life always be legally protected from conception, as well as 
abortion permitting states, who may prefer the right to life be legally protected generally but not 
in certain cases, as when the life of the mother is in danger.53 Yet, despite this linguistic innovation, 
there are still those that have argued that the United States’ failure to ratify the Convention rests 
in part on Article 4’s incompatibility with the domestic legal landscape.54 Using the COIL 
Framework, I argue that this view is misguided and ignores the realities of international law. 
The COIL Framework, developed by Barbara Koremenos, identifies the relationship 
between underlying problems plaguing cooperation and resulting treaty design provisions. One 
argument COIL advances and finds support for is that the existence of a Distribution Problem — 
a case in which parties have preferences over which norms or solutions are represented in an 
                                                
50 Organización de los Estados Americanos, Travaux Preparatoire for the American Convention on 
Human Rights, 1969. 
51 Forbes 2006 and Koremenos 2016, 171; abortion permitting states included Argentina, Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, and the United States of 
America. 
52 American Convention on Human Rights 1979, Article 4 (emphasis my own). 
53 Forbes 2006 and Koremenos 2016. 
54 See Diab 1992 and Rivera Juaristi 2013. 
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agreement — predicts language flexibility or imprecision.55 This prediction comes to life in the 
American Convention, through the addition of the words “in general” to Article 4. However, COIL 
also allows that some Distribution Problems may be too extreme to be solved through mere 
imprecise language.56 In these cases, the norms of states may be so divergent that another design 
mechanism is necessary: reservations, understandings, and/or declarations (RUDs). 
When RUDs are used, states may agree on a general norm inclusive of what the majority 
agree with and then allow states to individually reserve articles that they need to in order to 
maintain consistency with their domestic norms and policies. An example of this in the American 
Convention is a Guatemalan reservation due to its allowance, at the time of ratification, of the 
death penalty for common crimes.57 Although Guatemala demonstrated its commitment to a 
regional convention on human rights through its participation in its drafting, it may not have 
ratified the convention given its domestic policies on the death penalty had it not been able to 
reserve that part of the treaty.58 
                                                
55 Koremenos 2016, 166 and 170-171. Note that this hypothesis only holds given that there is no 
underlying Coordination Problem. According to COIL, a Coordination Problem is present when actors are 
better off cooperating only if they coordinate on an exact solution. Missing this exact solution would 
result in the agreement being more costly than not entering into the agreement at all. When a 
Coordination Problem complicates an existing Distribution Problem, COIL would not predict the same 
flexible/imprecise language in the agreement design, given that precise language is key to achieving the 
exact outcome necessary. Because human rights, and specifically the American Convention, are not 
characterized by a Coordination Problem, I proceed with my analysis given the design prescription for an 
agreement with Distribution, but not Coordination. See pages 165-167 of Koremenos 2016 for this 
argumentation. 
56 Koremenos 2016, 173-174. 
57 “American Convention on Human Rights: Signatories and Ratifications,” Treaties, 
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm 
58 As COIL predicts, Guatemala withdrew its reservation in 1986 as its norms shifted and it rewrote its 
Constitution, prohibiting the death penalty “on those convicted of… common crimes connected with 
political [ones].” See Constitución de Guatemala (1985), Article 18. Also see Koremenos 2016, 186-188. 
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Figure 2. RUDs to overcome greatly differing norms/preferences.59 
 
Given the availability of RUDs, the Substantive Limitations Argument seems lacking. 
After all, it appears as though a reservation to Article 4 would be sufficient in curbing substantive 
limitations the U.S. might have been concerned about, especially considering the American 
Convention’s general consistency with the United States’ domestic law. To test H2, I look for 
observations we would expect if it were true. One implication we might expect to see is that the 
United States would appear to intend to ratify the American Convention up until the language of 
Article 4 is finalized. Because the Substantive Limitations Argument implies Article 4 is the 
culprit for the U.S.’s failure to ratify the Convention despite its participation in the Convention’s 
drafting, we would expect the United States to not make efforts to ratify the Convention after 
Article 4 is finalized. 
  Given that the Substantive Limitations Argument points to inconsistencies between the 
Convention and the U.S. domestic legal landscape, we would expect opposition to ratification to 
be primarily discussed in terms of those inconsistencies. Therefore, we might also expect that, 
                                                
59 This figure is adapted from and inspired by a figure in Koremenos 2016, 173. 
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during the 1979 Senate hearings considering U.S. ratification of the Convention, we would see 
language to the effect of “Article 4 prevents us from ratifying” or “We would ratify if it were not 
for Article 4.” Additionally, we would expect these sentiments to be expressed in terms of 
prohibition. This is because, if reservations, declarations, and understandings are not sufficient to 
overcome the inconsistencies, the inconsistencies must be quite extreme.60 If they are not in terms 
of prohibition, we might expect arguments that the proposed RUDs to the American Convention 
are not sufficient to overcome the inconsistencies between U.S. domestic law and the 
Convention’s provisions. 
Although not as strong of evidence as directly referring to Article 4, in light of H2 being 
true, we might also expect vaguer statements, such as, “The norms of this agreement do not align 
with U.S. domestic policies.” The predicted implications are summarized in Table 3 below. 
Because of the above discussion about the likelihood of applying RUDs to the American 
Convention, I predict I will find little support for H2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
60 Refer again to Figure 2, which shows the argument represented in Koremenos 2016. Although some 
substantive disagreements may be quite large, RUDs should allow for overcoming them when the 
agreement is broadly consistent with a states’ norms and preferences. 
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Hypothesis and 
Predicted 
Implications 
Evidence Type 
H2.i The United States appears to intend to ratify the American Convention until 
the language of Article 4 is finalized and includes “in general, from the 
moment of conception.” 
H2.ii Statements identifying Article 4 as the reason why the United States cannot 
ratify. 
H2.iii Statements arguing that the reservations, understandings, and declarations 
are not sufficient to overcome inconsistencies with U.S. domestic law. 
H2.iv Statements claiming that the United States’ domestic law does not align with 
the American Convention’s provisions. 
 Table 3. Predicted implications if H2 is true. 
The Bricker Amendment Argument 
A second argument in the literature proposes that the United States’ failure to ratify the 
American Convention on Human Rights is due the legacy of the proposed Bricker Amendment to 
the Constitution.61 The Bricker Amendment was proposed by Senator John Bricker in the early 
1950s and would have severely constrained the ability of the United States to fully engage in the 
international legal realm by rendering all treaties non-self-executing. Non-self-executing 
agreements require, beyond U.S. ratification, additional domestic legislation for the agreement’s 
provisions to be enforceable. The final text of the proposed amendment was as follows: 
Section 1. A provision of a treaty or other international agreement which conflicts 
with this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect. 
                                                
61 Hevener Kaufman and Whiteman 1988; Diab 1992; Rivera Jurasti 2013; Henkin 1995. Bitker 1981 also 
discusses the importance of the Bricker Amendment proposal to future U.S. engagement with human 
rights agreements, although he nods towards the “split personality” nature of the United States in terms of 
human rights. As elaborated in the previous chapter of this thesis, my thesis hopes to empirically test the 
existence of this “split personality,” what I argue is the Restraint-Imposition tension. 
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Section 2. An international agreement other than a treaty shall become effective 
as internal law in the United States only by an act of Congress.62 
Section 3. On the question of advising and consenting to the ratification of a treaty 
the vote shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of persons voting 
for or against shall be entered on the Journal of the Senate. 
Section 4. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an 
amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several 
States within seven years from the date of its submission.63 
Several versions of the amendment circulated through the Senate before the above version 
of the Bricker Amendment was defeated by a mere one vote. Earlier drafts of the amendment were 
even more restrictive on international agreements and their domestic impact. For example, one 
early draft included restrictions on any international body from being authorized to “supervise, 
control, or adjudicate rights” of Americans.64 Yet another early draft of the amendment included 
even stronger language than the final version in terms of agreements being non-self-executing: “A 
treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation which 
would be valid in the absence of a treaty.”65 
Scholars who advocate the Bricker Amendment Argument have argued that, though the 
many versions of the amendment never passed, their proposal itself had the desired effect by 
awakening sovereignty and federalism concerns in senators as they considered future human rights 
agreements.66 According to Bricker Amendment literature, the relevant concerns raised by the 
                                                
62 Although agreements already require Senate consent for ratification, this provision of the Bricker 
Amendment would have additionally required Congress enact treaty provisions legislatively before they 
were domestically enforceable. In effect, this would mean that a treaty would have gone through the 
ratification process but still would not be legally enforceable in domestic courts without additional 
Congressional action. 
63 As quoted in Grant 1985, 576. 
64 S.J. Res. 1, 83rd Congress (1953). 
65 S.J. Res. 43, 83rd Congress (1953). 
66 Hevener Kaufman and Whiteman 1988 and Diab 1992. The proposal failed by a mere one vote in the 
Senate. This tendency can be observed in even vastly distinct human rights agreements such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 
and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). 
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Bricker Amendment were (1) maintaining the integrity of the U.S. federalist system, (2) avoiding 
international policing from other states, and (3) preserving the place of human rights as a domestic 
issue of the United States.67 
They take as evidence that RUDs proposed in consideration of human rights reflect the 
concerns the Bricker Amendment sought to address. For example, there is no domestic requirement 
that international law be implemented legislatively, as the Bricker Amendment would have 
required. However, international human rights agreements are nearly always ratified with a 
declaration rendering the agreement’s provisions non-self-executing, achieving the same effect. 
Likewise, ratification of human rights agreements often entails a suite of other reservations, 
understandings, and declarations that modify the United States’ international commitments.68 
Although I ultimately argue that the Bricker Amendment Argument proposed by scholars is flawed 
and incomplete, their logic, which points out the parallel between the proposed Bricker 
Amendment and RUDs in future international human rights consideration, leads to the inclusion 
of the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: The United States’ uneven engagement with the American Convention on Human 
Rights is due to concerns raised by the Bricker Amendment, which constrained the United 
States’ future ability and desire to ratify human rights agreements. 
 
There are two flaws with this argument that I address. First is an issue of post hoc ergo 
propter hoc reasoning: that the case is being made that Bricker caused failures to ratify only 
because Bricker occurred before U.S. failures to ratify human rights agreements. The central 
evidence used to support the claim that the Bricker Amendment’s effects are enduring is that 
                                                
67 Hevener Kaufman and Whiteman 1988, 312-3. 
68 Henkin 1995. 
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consideration of an international agreement nearly always includes an understanding rendering the 
agreement non-self-executing, mirroring the purpose of the Bricker Amendment. Certainly, this 
evidence supports the claim that the Bricker Amendment proposal has led to a pattern of 
weakening the international legal commitments made by the United States. However, it feels quite 
strong to further claim that the presence of Bricker-like RUDs can also be evidence for Bricker’s 
legacy on the United States’ record of human rights ratification. After all, the non-self-executing 
declaration proposed for human rights agreements that the United States has failed to ratify — 
such as the American Convention, CEDAW, and the International Covenant on Economic and 
Social Rights (ICESCR) — is the same non-self-executing declaration proposed and adopted for 
agreements the U.S. has ratified, such as the ICCPR, ICERD, and the Convention Against Torture 
(CAT).69 Therefore, it does not seem apparent that the proposed Bricker Amendment had the 
impact on ratification that scholars have suggested, beyond weakening ratification when it does 
occur. 
Setting this problem momentarily aside, another problem that arises with the Bricker 
Amendment Argument is that it characterizes the Bricker Amendment as the defining moment 
shaping future human rights ratification but does not sufficiently consider the context in which the 
Bricker Amendment was proposed. Scholars describe the “legacy of the Bricker Amendment” or 
the “ghost of Senator Bricker” within international human rights law, implying the endurance of 
the Bricker moment.70 Their framing of Bricker as the genesis for sovereignty and federalism 
concerns towards international human rights is misguided, especially in light of the work of 
                                                
69 For the American Convention, see Senate Hearings, 1979. For the CEDAW, see Exec. Rept. 107-9, 
107th Congress (2002). For the ICESCR, see Senate Foreign Relations Committee 1979. For the ICCPR, 
see United Nations Treaty Collection (UNTC), ICCPR, available at treaties.un.org. For ICERD, see 
UNTC, ICERD, available at treaties.un.org. For the CAT, see UNTC, CAT, available at treaties.un.org. 
70 Hevener Kaufman and Whiteman 1988 and Henkin 1995 
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historian Duane Tananbaum, which illustrates that the Bricker Amendment did not exist in a 
vacuum.71 
Tananbaum attributes the proposal of the Bricker Amendment to Senator Bricker’s and 
other conservative and isolationist senators’ apprehension towards the internationalist nature of 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. In particular, Tananbaum argues that Bricker and his 
coalition were weary of the United Nations and of human rights agreements influencing the United 
States and its domestic laws.72 Tananbaum claims that the arguments between proponents and 
opponents of the Bricker Amendment can “best be understood as a conflict pitting isolationists 
and conservatives against liberal internationalists.”73 Tananbaum illustrates this through the words 
of Frank Holman, former president of the American Bar Association and supporter of the Bricker 
Amendment, who described those advocating for human rights agreements and the UN Genocide 
Convention as “ardent internationalists” pursuing the erosion of the “sovereignty and 
independence of the United States.”74 Conversely, opposition focused on how the Bricker 
Amendment would “severely limit the powers and flexibility” necessary to be effective in foreign 
policy.75 Given Tananbaum’s characterization of the debate over Bricker and his evidence 
indicating that the amendment was a response to U.S. participation in the United Nations, I suggest 
that the proposal of the Bricker Amendment was not the revolutionary moment it is made out to 
be; rather, the Bricker Amendment may be a symptom, like the U.S.’s uneven human rights 
engagement, of the tension between the Restraint Approach and Imposition Approach of foreign 
policy described in Chapter Two. 
                                                
71 Tananbaum 1985. 
72 Id., 77. 
73 Id., 81. 
74 Id., 75. 
75 Id., 85. 
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If this is the case, we might expect to observe some overlap between our expectations in 
light of H3 — the Bricker Amendment Argument — and our expectations given the Bricker 
Amendment is symptomatic of the Restraint-Imposition tension. Because of this, I do expect to 
find some support for H3. However, I include a prediction about what we would expect of debates 
about joining international organizations prior to the Bricker Amendment. This will help get a 
sense of whether the concerns scholars claim exist are sparked by the Bricker Amendment or are 
present prior to it. 
If H3, that the Bricker Amendment has caused uneven engagement with the American 
Convention, is true, we might expect to see overt statements recalling the proposed amendment 
when individuals voice their opposition to ratification, e.g, “The Bricker Amendment set the 
precedent of not ratifying human rights agreements, therefore we should not ratify the American 
Convention.” Finding statements such as these would greatly support H3; failure to find statements 
like this, however, would not greatly weaken evidence for H3 because the effect of H3 would 
likely be more subtle than such statements. 
Therefore, we might also expect statements that less directly tie to the Bricker Amendment, 
but which reflect the language of its supporters from the 1950s. These would be statements such 
as, “Joining the American Convention on Human Rights could lead to violations of our 
sovereignty” or “The American Convention will be dangerous for our federalist system” or 
“These are domestic issues, not international ones.” These statements may also support H1.b.i 
and H1.b.ii. 
Therefore, an important part of this test is the expectation that, given H3 is true, the 
concerns raised by Bricker do not appear prior to consideration of the Bricker Amendment. 
After all, the Bricker Amendment Argument is that fears raised by the Bricker proposal itself are 
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the causal force. If the dynamic I contend exists is in fact not present and if the fears raised by the 
Bricker Amendment are truly the motivating force behind the United States’ failure to ratify the 
American Convention, these concerns must start with the Bricker Amendment. Tananbaum’s work 
has already provided some indication that there will not be support for this expectation; however, 
I venture to go back further in history to ensure some distance from the Bricker Amendment 
proposal. 
I will look to arguments in favor and against joining the League of Nations. I chose this 
case for two reasons. First, because consideration of membership to the League of Nations 
occurred over thirty years prior to consideration of the proposed Bricker Amendment. Second, 
because considering membership in the League of Nations involves a similar question as the 
Bricker Amendment did: to what extent should the United States involve itself internationally? If 
H3 is true, we would not expect statements in opposition to joining the League of Nations to be 
characterized by concerns that scholars would say were raised by the Bricker Amendment, such 
as sovereignty or federalism. For example, we would not expect opponents to League of Nations 
membership to claim that, “Joining the League of Nations could lead to violations of our 
sovereignty by other states” or “We should not subject ourselves to the will of other nations.” 
The predictions in light of H3 are summarized in the table below. 
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Hypothesis and 
Predicted 
Implications 
Evidence Type 
H3.i Explicitly invoking the Bricker Amendment or the period it was proposed to 
argue in opposition to ratification of the American Convention. 
H3.ii Statements claiming that ratifying the American Convention would be a 
threat to the United States’ sovereignty, federalist system, or jurisdiction 
over domestic matters. 
H3.iii The arguments against joining the League of Nations are not expressed in 
terms of the concerns of the Bricker Amendment (i.e. protecting sovereignty, 
the U.S. federalist system, or the U.S.’s jurisdiction over its domestic 
matters). 
 Table 4. Predicted Implications given H3 is true. 
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Chapter Four 
METHODS 
The question remains, why does the United States engage unevenly in international human 
rights? In this section of the thesis, I describe my use of process tracing methods to investigate and 
respond to this question. In order to do so, I first briefly define process tracing and how it is useful 
for the project at hand. This descriptive account gives way to a review of the four tests used within 
process tracing which I use in this study. Finally, I apply these tests to the predicted implications 
I defined within Chapter Two and Chapter Three and describe how I went about collecting the 
evidence to evaluate each implication. 
Process Tracing: The case of the cookie culprit 
 Taught to me from a young age was that the foundation of research is to examine cause 
and effect. Which X is causing the Y that we observe? However, social and political phenomena 
are much more complex than this foundational principle, requiring complex regressions and 
control variables. With this project, I was confronted with how to apply similar rigor within one 
case — the American Convention — as well as how to analyze what is not a one-dimensional 
cause, but a dynamic: uneven engagement. 
 Process tracing is unique in that it “attempts to identify the intervening causal process— 
the causal chain and causal mechanism— between an independent variable (or variables) and the 
outcome of the dependent variable.”76 That is, it aims to reveal what lies inside the “black box of 
causality” between a hypothesized cause (X) and effect (Y) and, in doing so, assess whether the 
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chain linking the two holds.77 Because of this focus on the chain of evidence, process tracing is a 
rather flexible method, allowing for evidence to be collected from different sources, assessed 
independently, but still contributing to an updating of our belief in a hypothesis.78 
 How much we can update our belief in a hypothesis relies on the kind of test we apply in 
light of the type of evidence — the predicted implication — at hand. The tests themselves provide 
more clarity on this point. Process tracing defines four distinct “tests,” each one describing what 
is required of the type of evidence to pass the test and what passing the test — or failing it — 
implies for our belief in the hypothesis. These tests are the “Straw-in-the-Wind” test, the “Hoop” 
test, the “Smoking-Gun” test, and the “Doubly Decisive” test.79 Which test a type of evidence 
undergoes depends on the evidence’s uniqueness and its certainty, where uniqueness indicates the 
evidence’s potential to confirm the hypothesis and certainty indicates the evidence’s potential to 
disconfirm rival hypotheses.80 Figure 3 on page 46 summarizes this point and where each test falls 
along the spectrums of uniqueness and certainty. However, I first explain each test in more detail 
using the case of the cookie culprit to understand what the tests imply. 
 The Straw-in-the-Wind test is applied to implications that are neither unique to or certain 
in light of the hypothesis the implication is attached to. This is the weakest test, as passing the test 
provides only slight evidence in favor of a hypothesis and failing provides slight evidence against 
it.81 To highlight this point, imagine a case where you are trying to determine which one of your 
family members took the last cookie from the jar in the kitchen, which was meant to be yours. You 
formulate the hypothesis that it was your sister who took the cookie. One of your predictions in 
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79 Collier 2011. 
80 Beach and Pederson 2013, 103. 
81 Id., 102 and Collier 2011, 826. 
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light of this hypothesis is that your sister will have cookie crumbs on her shirt if she ate your 
cookie. This is a Straw-in-the-Wind implication. The prediction is not unique; even if your sister 
took the last cookie, other members of your family might have cookie crumbs on their shirts 
because they ate their own cookie for the day. The prediction is also not certain; your sister may 
have been extremely careful in eating the cookie and avoided the crumbs altogether or she may 
have changed shirts to avoid detection. Therefore, if you indeed notice crumbs on her shirt, passing 
the Straw-in-the-Wind test, you only find slight evidence in favor of your hypothesis; conversely, 
if you find no crumbs on her shirt, there is only slight evidence against her having taken your 
cookie. 
The Hoop test is applied to implications that have some degree of certainty but a low level 
of uniqueness. Failing a Hoop test provides somewhat strong evidence against the hypothesis, 
because of its high disconfirmatory power, but passing a hoop test provides only slight evidence 
in favor of the hypothesis.82 Beach and Pederson additionally acknowledge that not all Hoop tests 
are made the same; the ‘hoop’ may get smaller to jump through as the uniqueness of the implication 
increases.83 Consider again the case of the missing cookie. One predicted implication, in light of 
the hypothesis that your sister stole the cookie, is that she was in the house sometime between 4pm 
and 5pm, which is the window of time between when you last saw the cookie and then noticed it 
was gone. In this case, the prediction is not unique; many or all of your other family members 
could also have been in the house during that time. However, the prediction is highly certain; that 
is, if you find that your sister was not in the house during that time, failing the Hoop Test, there is 
very strong evidence against your hypothesis that she stole the cookie. A narrower Hoop test would 
involve a more unique implication. For example, you might test the implication that your sister 
                                                
82 Beach and Pederson 2013, 102 and Collier 2011, 286-287. 
83 Beach and Pederson 2013, 103. 
LEADER OF RIGHTS? 
45 
was in the kitchen, rather than the entire house, between 4-5pm.84 Yet, this is still a Hoop test 
because the predicted implication is still not entirely unique. 
Implications with a high degree of uniqueness but a low degree of certainty are subject to 
the Smoking-Gun test. This test, if passed, provides strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis but, 
if failed, does not strongly weaken our belief in the hypothesis. Still in search of the cookie culprit, 
you predict that your sister might brag to your brother about stealing the last cookie. To test this, 
you recruit your brother to say, “I wish our parents would let us have two cookies a day,”  in front 
of your sister, predicting she will brag about having eaten two cookies — hers and yours. If this 
were to happen, it would be highly unique; if your sister did not actually steal the last cookie, the 
probability she would say that she did is very low. However, this scenario is very uncertain; your 
sister might have stolen the cookie, but she grows suspicious of your brother baiting her to confess 
and withholds comment. Passing this test would nearly confirm your hypothesis that your sister 
stole the cookie, but failing it would only marginally weaken the hypothesis. 
Lastly, the Doubly Decisive test involves implications with both a high degree of 
uniqueness and high degree of certainty, rendering it the strongest possible test for evidence. 
Passing this test greatly substantiates the hypothesis, to the point of almost eliminating rival 
hypotheses, and failing it only somewhat reduces our confidence in the hypothesis. However, as 
the process tracing methods scholarship asserts, it is highly unusual to have predicted implications 
that would rise to the level of a Doubly Decisive test, given the complexity of real-world cases.85 
For the case of the cookie culprit, a Doubly Decisive test might be applied if there is a video 
surveillance camera in the kitchen that can be reviewed to see who stole the cookie. If, upon 
                                                
84 Beach and Pederson use a similar example of a crime suspect. One Hoop test might be whether the 
suspect was in the state where the crime occurred, but a far narrower Hoop test would ask if he was in the 
neighborhood the crime took place in at the same time it took place. See Beach and Pederson 2013, 103. 
85 Beach and Pederson 2013, 104 and Collier 2011 287. 
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review, you see your sister take the last cookie, you can confirm that she is, in fact, the cookie 
culprit. If however, she is not seen taking the cookie on the surveillance camera — perhaps it was 
your brother who misled you by agreeing to help you catch your sister — she can be entirely 
absolved of suspicion and your hypothesis is rejected.86 
 
 
Figure 3. Process Tracing tests87 
 
Application 
 With an understanding of the types of tests available using process tracing and the degree 
to which each test updates our belief in a given hypothesis, I now turn to the predicted implications 
described throughout Chapters Two and Three.88 Starting with H1, I consider the uniqueness and 
                                                
86 Beach and Pederson also use the example of video surveillance with respect to the crime suspect. See 
Beach and Pederson 2013, 104. 
87 This figure is adapted from Figure 6.1 in Beach Pederson 2013, which can be found on page 103. 
88 A table including each predicted implication can be found in Appendix A. 
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certainty of each implication so that it can be assessed using the correct test. Uniqueness will be 
assessed by whether the probability of finding a piece of evidence (e), if the hypothesis (H) is true, 
is higher than the probability of finding the same piece of evidence if the hypothesis is not true. 
That is, that p(e|H) > p(e|~H).89 Predicted implications will be considered more unique the greater 
the difference between these two probabilities would be. Certainty will be assessed by how 
necessary e is if H is true, with perfect certainty being represented by p(e|H) = 1. In this scenario, 
p(H|~e) = 0.90  
H1 Implications 
H1: The United States’ uneven engagement (participation in negotiation but failure to 
ratify) with the American Convention on Human Rights is a symptom of the tension 
between the Restraint Approach and Imposition Approach to norm exportation. 
 
Recall the implications of H1 discussed in Chapter Two, of which half indicated the 
presence of the Restraint Approach to norm exportation (H1.a) and the other half represented the 
presence of the Imposition Approach (H1.b). The Restraint Approach implications are as follows: 
Statements claiming that participation in the American Convention will improve the United 
States’ ability to promote human rights norms (H1.a.i) and, conversely, statements claiming 
the United States will miss out on the opportunity to influence the protection and practice of 
human rights by not ratifying the American Convention (H1.a.ii). Both statements exhibit a low-
to-moderate uniqueness. It is plausible that if ~H1, we could observe statements like these. 
However, statements like these exhibit a high degree of certainty because the probability of H1 
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being true is low if we have no evidence that arguments made in favor of ratification are voiced in 
terms of spreading U.S. human rights norms. This results in a Hoop test for H1.a.i. and H1.a.ii. 
 The implications that represent the Imposition Approach to norm exportation are as 
follows: Statements claiming that participating in the American Convention will open the United 
States to unnecessary or unwanted intervention in U.S. domestic affairs (H1.b.i), statements 
claiming that ratifying the Convention will not increase U.S. influence in human rights beyond 
what it already is (H1.b.ii), and statements expressing concern over the possibility of the U.S. 
being taken to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (H1.b.iii). The first implication, 
H1.b.i, will be tested by the Hoop test because its presence is not highly unique to H1. This is 
especially true in light of the conjecture that the Bricker Amendment may also be a symptom of 
H1, so some evidence of H3 may be similar or the same as evidence of H1. However, H1.b.i does 
carry a high degree of certainty because we would expect proponents of the Imposition Approach 
to reject international examination of the United States’ domestic affairs when its human rights 
practices are purported to already “secure the proper conditions for real freedom.”91 
 H1.b.ii has a moderate-to-high degree of uniqueness, especially compared to H2 and H3, 
because it argues norm exportation is already something the United States can achieve unilaterally. 
This implication focuses on the outward-looking nature of the Imposition Approach rather than 
the internal nature of H2 — arguing that the American Convention’s substance is in conflict with 
domestic law — and H3 — arguing that the American Convention is undesirable because of 
concerns over intervention raised by the Bricker Amendment. However, H1.b.ii has a low degree 
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of certainty because, in considering ratification of an international agreement, the isolationist 
nature of the Imposition Approach would likely be more salient.92 
 H1.b.iii is characterized by both low-to-moderate uniqueness and low-to-moderate 
uncertainty and is therefore probed with a Straw-in-the-Wind test. Its low uniqueness is a result of 
the same logic explaining low uniqueness for H1.b.i: apprehension for oversight of the United 
States’ human rights practices is an implication for both H1 and H3. However, unlike H1.b.i, 
H1.b.iii is characterized by low uncertainty in light of the fact that the United States need not 
accept the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court to ratify the American Convention. 
Yet, I still anticipate concerns over the Court to be raised, because it is much more powerful of an 
enforcement mechanism than is present in other international human rights agreements. Therefore, 
H1.b.iii may be observed as a secondary concern, but it is not a highly certain observation if H1 is 
true. Table 2 from Chapter One is updated below with the appropriate tests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
92 Again, see Chapter Two, section titled “The Imposition Approach,” which articulates the isolationist 
nature of the Imposition Approach. 
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Hypothesis 
and Predicted 
Implication 
Evidence Type Test 
H1.a.i Statements claiming that participation in the American 
Convention will improve the United States’ ability to 
promote human rights norms. 
Hoop 
H1.a.ii Statements claiming the United States will miss out on the 
opportunity to influence the protection and practice of 
human rights by not ratifying the American Convention. 
Hoop 
H1.b.i Statements claiming that participating in the American 
Convention will open the United States to unnecessary or 
unwanted intervention. 
Hoop 
H1.b.ii Statements claiming that ratifying the Convention will not 
increase U.S. influence in human rights beyond what it 
already is. 
Smoking Gun 
H1.b.iii Statements expressing concern over the possibility of the 
U.S. being taken to the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights. 
Straw-in-the- 
Wind 
 Table 5. Predicted implications and tests if H1 is true. 
H2 Implications 
H2: The U.S.’s uneven engagement with the American Convention on Human Rights is 
due to substantive limitations, especially Article 4, that are inconsistent with the U.S.’s 
domestic law. 
 
The implications of the Substantive Limitations Argument, presented in Chapter Two, are 
as follows: The United States appears to intend to ratify the American Convention until the 
language of Article 4 (Right to Life) is finalized and includes “protected by law and, in general, 
from the moment of conception” (H2.i), statements identifying Article 4 as the reason why the 
United States cannot ratify (H2.ii), statements arguing that the reservations, understandings, and 
declarations are not sufficient to overcome inconsistencies with U.S. domestic law (H2.iii), and 
LEADER OF RIGHTS? 
51 
statements claiming that the United States’ domestic law does not align with the American 
Convention’s provisions (H2.iv). 
 H2.i will be tested using a Smoking Gun test. It would be highly unique to H2 for the 
United States to change its tenor towards ratification just as the Right to Life language was 
finalized. However, it is surely not a certain implication as Article 4 may have been a more or less 
salient concern between the Convention’s negotiation and the Senate’s consideration of 
ratification. Implication H2.ii will also be tested using a Smoking Gun test. Although there is high 
uniqueness in an actor directly naming Article 4 as the reason the American Convention should 
not be ratified, our belief in H2 is not greatly reduced if actors are not so direct or if they focus on 
substantive limitations beyond Article 4. 
 H2.iii and H2.iv will be tested with a narrower Hoop test. First, these implications are 
highly certain. Whether actors specifically discuss Article 4 or whether they point out other 
substantive inconsistencies between the American Convention and U.S. domestic law, H2 requires 
actors argue for not ratifying in terms of these inconsistencies (H2.iv) and that they view RUDs as 
insufficient to overcome inconsistencies (H2.iii). Additionally, these implications feature a 
moderate amount of uniqueness, although not enough to put them into the Doubly Decisive test 
quadrant. They are unique in the sense that neither H1 or H3 are primarily concerned with 
substantive inconsistencies in the American Convention; they are concerned with intervention. 
Therefore, concerns are much more likely to be expressed in terms of avoiding international 
intervention than in terms of substance. However, H2.iii and H2.iv are not completely unique 
implications because one could imagine that, if H1 or H3 are true, actors may voice concern about 
substantive inconsistencies — and RUDs’ inability to overcome them — insofar as intervention 
could result in needing to conform to inconsistent norms expressed in the American Convention. 
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Hypothesis and 
Predicted 
Implications 
Evidence Type Test 
H2.i The United States appears to intend to ratify the 
American Convention until the language of Article 4 is 
finalized and includes “in general, from the moment of 
conception.” 
Smoking Gun 
H2.ii Statements identifying Article 4 as the reason why the 
United States cannot ratify. 
Smoking Gun 
H2.iii Statements arguing that the reservations, understandings, 
and declarations are not sufficient to overcome 
inconsistencies with U.S. domestic law. 
Narrow Hoop 
H2.iv Statements claiming that the United States’ domestic law 
does not align with the American Convention’s 
provisions. 
Narrow Hoop 
 Table 6. Predicted implications and tests if H2 is true. 
H3 Implications 
H3: The United States’ uneven engagement with the American Convention on Human 
Rights is due to concerns raised by the Bricker Amendment, which constrained the United 
States’ future ability and desire to ratify human rights agreements. 
 
The predicted implications of H3 are as follows: explicitly invoking the Bricker 
Amendment or the period during which it was proposed to argue in opposition to ratification of 
the American Convention (H3.i), statements claiming that ratifying the American Convention 
would be a threat to the United States’ sovereignty, federalist system, or jurisdiction over 
domestic matters (H3.ii), and that the arguments against joining the League of Nations are not 
expressed in terms of the concerns of the Bricker Amendment (H3.iii). 
 Implication H3.i, that actors will explicitly invoke the Bricker Amendment, is highly 
unique to H3 but also carries a low certainty, as the impacts of the Bricker Amendment, if H3 is 
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true, could be much more subtle. Given high uniqueness and low certainty, H3.i will be tested 
using a Smoking Gun test. H3.ii will be tested using a Hoop test. This implication carries a low-
to-moderate degree of uniqueness given my conjecture that the proposal of the Bricker 
Amendment may also be a result of H1.93 However, its certainty is rather high; after all, the Bricker 
Amendment argument contends that the United States fails to ratify human rights agreements 
because of the concerns, raised by Bricker and expressed by H3.ii. 
 Lastly, H3.iii will be tested using a Doubly Decisive test. H3 argues that the proposal of 
the Bricker Amendment created concerns over the protection of sovereignty and federalism as well 
as maintaining U.S. jurisdiction over domestic matters. Given that discussions of whether to join 
the League of Nations occurred about thirty years prior to the Bricker Amendment, if H3 is true, 
we would not expect consideration of the League of Nations to reflect the language and concerns 
of the Bricker Amendment. This test has a high degree of uniqueness; it is unlikely for this dramatic 
shift in how politicians discuss joining international organizations to occur if ~H3. The test also 
has a high degree of certainty. If the concerns H3 says are raised by the Bricker Amendment are 
in fact present prior to it, H3 cannot be the case. The table below summarizes each implication of 
H3 and its test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
93 See section of this Chapter titled, “Implications of H1.” 
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Hypothesis and 
Predicted 
Implications 
Evidence Type Test 
H3.i Explicitly invoking the Bricker Amendment or the period 
it was proposed to argue in opposition to ratification of 
the American Convention. 
Smoking Gun 
H3.ii Statements claiming that ratifying the American 
Convention would be a threat to the United States’ 
sovereignty, federalist system, or jurisdiction over 
domestic matters. 
Hoop 
H3.iii The arguments against joining the League of Nations are 
not expressed in terms of the concerns of the Bricker 
Amendment (i.e. protecting sovereignty, the U.S. 
federalist system, or the U.S.’s jurisdiction over its 
domestic matters). 
Doubly Decisive 
 Table 7. Predicted implications and tests if H3 is true. 
Collecting Evidence 
Evidence was collected from several primary and secondary sources, ranging from the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings held in 1979 to historical accounts of the 1919 
impasse between the Senate and President Woodrow Wilson over U.S. participation in the League 
of Nations. Evidence was also collected from Organization of American States documents, 
including several of the American Convention’s preparatory documents from 1959 to 1969. In this 
section of the chapter, I briefly introduce the most significant sources used and, in doing so, discuss 
how they target the implications discussed in the previous sections. I then describe the process 
undertaken with each document in terms of collecting evidence. In Chapter Five I analyze and 
discuss the results. 
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1979 Senate Hearings 
 The document from which I collected the bulk of the evidence for the predicted 
implications was the 1979 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, which considered four 
international human rights agreements for ratification: the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (ICESCR), 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), 
and the American Convention on Human Rights. The hearings were conducted in November 1979 
at the request of President Jimmy Carter, who had taken up the mantle of pursuing increased U.S. 
involvement in international human rights agreements.94 
The Foreign Relations Committee heard over 40 witnesses testify in favor of or opposition 
to ratification of the treaties. Witnesses ranged from international lawyers to conservative activists 
to academics to human rights NGO members and more. I analyzed this document with the aim of 
assessing evidence for all of the predicted implications listed in Appendix A except for H2.i and 
H3.iii, which I address below. Besides those exceptions, the majority of predicted implications  
regarded how people argued in favor of or against ratification of the American Convention. It 
seemed appropriate to look primarily to Senate Hearings to collect this type of evidence for several 
reasons. First, there are a variety of individual witnesses as well as statements for the record 
submitted by organizations. In cases where implications have low uniqueness, finding evidence 
for the same implication across distinct actors may serve to increase the uniqueness of the 
                                                
94 During his inaugural address, Carter proclaimed, “Because we are free we can never be indifferent to 
the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clear cut preference for these societies which 
share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights. We do not seek to intimidate, but it is clear 
that a world which others can dominate with impunity would be inhospitable to decency and a threat to 
the well-being of all people.” See Carter 1977. 
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evidence, strengthening it.95 Second, if there is a debate or tension between the Restraint Approach 
and Imposition Approach, it would be optimal to look for evidence in a source where that tension 
might play out, rather than turning to isolated statements made by different actors at different 
times. This allows for observations regarding how actors respond to each other and analyses about 
the kinds of questions the Committee members ask. With a justification as to the use of the Senate 
hearings established, I now describe how I collected units of evidence from them. 
Some testimony was exclusive to a particular one of the four human rights agreements up 
for consideration; where this was the case, I collected statements only if they implicated the 
American Convention. However, there was also often testimony in which the witness applied their 
reasoning to human rights ratification more generally. In these cases, I collected the quote unless 
context made it clear that the statement was not intended to apply to the American Convention.96 
Because the Senate hearing document is quite large, totaling 567 pages, I did a preliminary 
collection of evidence, highlighting all statements that could remotely be taken as evidence of a 
particular implication. With the initially large document greatly reduced, I revisited the highlighted 
statements, considering them more stringently against the predicted implications. If a statement 
reflected a predicted implication, I included the statement in the corresponding table(s) in 
Appendix B, according to the implication(s) it supports.97 If a statement was not sufficient in 
reflecting an implication, or if I noticed a contextual cue that disqualified it from consideration, I 
did not include it in the table. 
                                                
95 See Beach and Pederson 2013, 131. 
96 For example, some testimonies would include isolated statements appearing to be broadly applicable, 
but, within context of the full testimony, were qualified with phrases such as “the UN treaties.” 
97 Too many statements were collected to be able to address each one; however, in Chapter Five, I 
highlight several statements that are either representative of the majority or are of particular interest. 
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American Convention Preparatory Documents 
The preparatory documents — or travaux preparatoire — of the American Convention are 
also lengthy documents. They span a decade and are distinct in character. The earliest document, 
from 1959, called for the preparation of a draft human rights convention and the final document, 
from 1969, details the last leg of negotiation and eventual adoption of a final draft, now known as 
the American Convention on Human Rights. For the purposes of this thesis, I primarily used the 
preparatory documents to assess implication H2.i, which predicted that the United States would 
appear to intend to ratify the Convention until the language of Article 4 (the Right to Life) was 
finalized. Although I discuss this further in the following chapter, these documents also included 
a rather interesting statement by the United States that provides evidence that substantive concerns 
were never at the heart of the U.S.’s uneven engagement with the Convention.98 
Collecting evidence from these documents was less explicitly systematic than the process 
used with the Senate Hearings for two reasons, the first substantive and the second circumstantial. 
First, the primary goal of the preparatory documents was not to assess the particular language used 
to argue in favor or against the agreement, as it was with the Senate Hearings. Rather, the goal was 
to gain a sense of whether the United States’ engagement with the system shifted before and after 
Article 4 was finalized and voted on. Therefore, unlike the Senate Hearings, my focus could be 
narrowed on one actor — the United States — rather than analyzing statements made by all 
involved actors. Second, in my initial review of the 1959 document, I discovered a statement by 
the United States that clearly and definitively contradicted the implication stated by H2.i.99 
                                                
98 See Chapter Five discussion of the Substantive Limitations Argument. 
99 Although I discuss in greater depth in Chapter Five, the statement observed is as follows: “The United 
States, as is well known, has since its birth as a nation strongly defended human rights. The promotion of 
respect for human rights in the inter-American system is therefore supported by the United States. While 
the United States, because of the structure of its Federal Government, does not find it possible to enter 
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Because of this unexpected but decisive observation, I chose to redirect my time for an in-depth 
analysis of the Senate Hearings, where the evidence was likely to be less clear and more time 
consuming to collect. I discuss the 1959 statement and its implications for each hypothesis in the 
chapter that follows. 
Debating the League of Nations 
An analysis of the debate over participation in the League of Nations is called for by 
implication H3.iii, which predicts that arguments made for and against joining the League of 
Nations will not be made in terms of Bricker Amendment concerns. To summarize, these included 
a desire to preserve U.S. sovereignty, protect against federalism infringements, and maintain 
jurisdiction over domestic matters. First, I must address that this is not a perfect case comparison 
to the American Convention. It would certainly have been more optimal to assess arguments for 
or against a human rights agreement similar to the American Convention which was considered 
prior to the Bricker Amendment proposal. 
This is a narrow pool, indeed. The American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Genocide Convention were all considered as 
potential cases. All three satisfied the condition of being adopted prior to the Bricker Amendment 
proposal.100 However, the two declarations were not binding — at least not at the time of 
adoption101 — which distinguishes them greatly from the American Convention. Additionally, all 
                                                
into multilateral conventions with respect to human rights or with respect to an Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, it, of course, raises no objection to other states’ entering into conventions on these 
subjects should they find it possible to do so. Accordingly, while the United States has voted in favor of 
Resolution VIII, Human Rights, it reserves its position with respect to its participation in the instruments 
or organisms that may evolve.” 
100 All three were adopted in 1948. 
101 The American Declaration is used when petitions against the United States arise in the Inter-American 
Commission. See Chapter One. Also, The Universal Declaration is now arguably customary international 
law, and therefore is binding on states. 
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three agreements were adopted in a vastly different context than the American Convention, with 
the American Declaration, Universal Declaration, and Genocide Convention102 largely arising in 
response to the egregious human rights abuses of the Holocaust and World War II. Lastly, all three, 
though adopted prior to the Bricker Amendment proposal, were not so distanced from the proposal 
to guarantee that the observations were entirely independent of Bricker sentiments. 
Assessing the consideration of U.S. participation in the League of Nations creates this 
distance, as League of Nations membership consideration occurred in 1919, over thirty years 
before the Bricker Amendment proposal. Additionally, though the League of Nations is distinct 
from the American Convention, its consideration involves many of the same critical questions that 
are relevant for human rights ratification. Most importantly, should the United States involve itself 
in an internationally cooperative endeavor, why or why not? 
Having established a justification for the use of the League of Nations as a case to assess 
H3.iii, I now turn to describe the documents used for H3.iii’s analysis. For primary sources, I rely 
on the Senate debate over the League of Nations.103 However, I supplement the primary source 
documents with secondary source accounts of the arguments for and against League of Nations 
participation.104 This decision is supported by Beach and Pederson, who argue that using historical 
scholarship, especially when the literature is well developed and a topic is big, can improve 
accuracy and efficiency of analysis.105 
                                                
102 The Genocide Convention was eventually ratified by the United States in 1988, forty years after it was 
adopted by the United Nations. It, therefore, follows the same pattern of uneven engagement by the 
United States, although it is not a perfect case comparison for the purposes here because initial 
consideration of the Convention occurred not long before the Bricker Amendment was proposed. 
103 U.S. Cong. Record. 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 1919. 
104 Jeong 2017 and Mervin 1971. 
105 See Beach and Pederson 2013, 141. 
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Using these primary and secondary source accounts, I look for evidence of Bricker 
Amendment concerns in the consideration of League of Nations membership. The absence of these 
concerns — maintaining sovereignty, federalism, and jurisdiction over domestic affairs — would 
indicate evidence in favor of H3.iii. However, I also look for whether these concerns feature 
prominently in League of Nations opposition or if they are secondary concerns. The concerns must 
feature prominently to count as evidence against H3.iii. 
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Chapter Five 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 In this chapter, I report the results of the source analyses conducted in the study, going in 
order of the hypotheses and implications. In addition to reporting whether each predicted 
implication was found in the analysis, I pull representative quotes from the Senate Hearings, 
American Convention preparatory documents, and League of Nations debates to illustrate the 
implications within their context. By highlighting statements from these different sources, the 
similarity of sentiments between them from 1919 to 1979 is revealed. I ultimately conclude that, 
although the Bricker Amendment is championed as the instigator of sovereignty, federalism, and 
domestic jurisdiction concerns, these apprehensions were present in considering U.S. international 
institutional participation long before Senator Bricker raised them. Additionally I find support for 
the claim that uneven engagement is a result of the tension between Restraint and Imposition 
Approaches to norm exportation. In particular, I observe that arguments made in favor of the 
American Convention were largely and almost universally made in the language of the Restraint 
Approach. The sentiment of the Imposition Approach, though supported, requires further testing 
in different contexts. 
The Restraint-Imposition Approaches 
 The careful reading of the 1979 Senate Hearing documents and comparison to the predicted 
implications resulted in the collection of over 250 quotes. Of these, 78 quotes were ultimately 
determined to not strictly match one of the predicted implications; however, I have included many 
of these in Appendix D, as they often were the negative statement to one of the implications and 
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may therefore be of interest.106 However, only the remaining quotes, which directly matched a 
predicted implication made in Chapters Two and Three, are included in the analysis. These quotes 
are included in Appendix B.107 
Overwhelmingly, individuals voiced their support for ratification of the American 
Convention in terms of H1.a.i and H1.a.ii: that ratification would position the United States to 
better promote human rights abroad and that a failure to ratify would undermine the United States’ 
ability to do so. As predicted, these statements often connected back to the United States’ ability 
to influence the institutional framework of the international human rights regime and, in particular, 
the American Convention on Human Rights. Two justifications for these claims were most 
common, both for the positive framing (H1.a.i) and the negative framing (H1.a.ii). 
First, that U.S. ratification of international human rights agreements would make it a more 
credible actor, improving its ability to export norms. For example, one witness, international law 
professor Covey Oliver, argued, “The four conventions before you today… are not needed to 
conform American law to more just human rights ends… but to aline [sic] us with the ‘good side’ 
in world affairs and give us the credibility we now lack as we use our influence to promote human 
rights.”108 In the negative framing, Donald McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, claimed “it has 
become increasingly difficult for the United States in good conscience and with credibility to call 
forth and hold accountable before the international community notorious human rights abusers.”109 
                                                
106 For example, there were many quotes directly negating H2, stating that the United States’ domestic 
laws were highly compatible with the American Convention. Additionally, there were quotes that took 
issue with the expansive nature of the reservations, negating H2.iii. See Appendix C. 
107 The table in Appendix B includes the quote, who said it, what page of the Senate Hearings it is 
included in, and the implication it reflects. Appendix C additionally includes all of the witnesses whose 
quotes were collected as well as a brief description of their occupation or relevance in the hearings. 
108 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1979, International Human Rights Treaties, 
128. Hereafter referred to as “Senate Hearings, 1979.” 
109 Senate Hearings, 1979, 407. 
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The second common justification for claiming that ratification would better position the 
United States to promote human rights was that it would improve the U.S.’s access to international 
institutions themselves. Patricia Derian, Assistant Secretary of the State Department in the Bureau 
of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, points out, “By ratifying the American Human Rights 
Convention, we will be eligible to nominate and vote for [the Court’s] members, which we are not 
eligible to do now.”110 Morton Skylar, international lawyer and chairman of the Helsinki Watch 
Committee, offers the negative, H1.a.ii, framing: “...until we become a party to these agreements 
we can have little or no voice to help shape and improve the international procedures used to 
monitor and assure compliance.”111 
All totaled, thirty-four different actors — ranging from attorneys to religious leaders and 
more — expressed one of two, or both, predicted Restraint Approach sentiments. Recalling the 
tests articulated in the previous chapter, both H1.a.i and H1.a.ii were probed using a Hoop test, 
meaning that, if H1 is true, it was very certain that statements like these would be found, but the 
statements are not necessarily unique to H1, especially in one-off observations. Given the great 
amount of observations of both H1.a.i and H1.a.ii, and that the observations were collected from 
the testimony of a diverse group of actors, I conclude that both implications pass the Hoop tests, 
providing evidence in favor of H1. 
The second part of H1 involves the Imposition Approach predictions. Of the three, H1.b.i 
and H1.b.ii were at least somewhat supported. H1.b.i predicted actors would state that ratification 
would lead to unwanted or unnecessary intervention in the United States. Twenty-nine statements 
made by sixteen different witnesses expressed this idea. For example, Phyllis Schlafly, a 
conservative author and activist, warned, “We know that treaties pose much more of a hazard to 
                                                
110 Id., 43. 
111 Id., 272. 
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Americans than to any other nation because of the preeminence of treaties in our system of 
government.”112 Statements were also collected from witnesses who were not in agreement with 
Schlafly, but who recognized these were concerns held by others; such is the case with California 
Congressman George Miller, who offered, “I think the Senate always has had a conservative voice 
which suggests that anything like this is a relinquishing of our sovereignty.”113 Statements like 
Congressman Miller’s were still collected as support for H1.b.i, much like a secondary source 
account might be. Although not the Congressman’s own view, his acknowledgement that others 
hold this view still serves as evidence that the view is, in fact, held. 
 H1.b.i was probed with a Hoop test. Therefore, I conclude that there is some evidence for 
H1 in light of the H1.b.i implication, although perhaps not as decisive as for the H1.a predictions, 
which had many more individual pieces of evidence reflecting them. This is likely the case because 
there were far fewer anti-ratification witnesses present throughout the hearings. This may be the 
result of a selection effect. Even assuming — and this would be quite an assumption — that the 
Foreign Relations Committee invited an equal number of witnesses in favor and against 
ratification, it is imaginable that witnesses would be more likely to take the time to testify for a 
cause they believed in. 
With regard to H1.b.ii, statements claiming ratification would not afford the United States 
greater influence in human rights abroad, there were a small handful of statements that reflected 
this argument. For example, Schlafly asserts, “I do believe that ratification of these covenants 
would be an exercise in folly, futility, and frustration. We would gain nothing. We would have 
better guarantees in this country and have better relations with other lands if we would reject them, 
                                                
112 Senate Hearings, 1979, 113. This is also an example of a statement coded both for H1.b.i and H3.ii. 
113 Id., 145. 
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in toto.”114 Attorney and law professor Philip Anderegg echoes Schlafly’s declaration of the futility 
of human rights agreements for the United States: “it is most unwise, as I repeatedly have heard 
suggested, that the United States should ratify the treaties as a gesture or an act of encouragement 
to other countries. I believe it is manifest that the gesture will be futile."115 
Because H1.b.ii was assigned the Smoking-Gun test,116 even a small handful of statements 
is meaningful, given their unique nature in light of H1. However, I am hesitant to claim that H1.b.ii 
passes the test, especially in light of the potential selection bias described above. Schlafly and 
Anderegg are both among the few witnesses who argue against ratification, and they both speak 
in the unique ways of H1.b.ii. However, though this is true, it is unclear how they feature relative 
to general anti-ratification sentiments as it is possible that the strength of their opposition is 
selected for given they, like those in favor of ratification, appear to believe in their cause; only, 
their cause is one against human rights agreements. For this reason, the results of testing H1.b.ii 
are inconclusive, though there may be some evidence supporting it within the Senate hearings. 
Lastly, H1.b.iii, the implication that concern would be raised about the Inter-American 
Court, was not supported in the Senate Hearing documents. None of those opposed to ratification 
mentioned the Inter-American Court and, where it was mentioned, witnesses were largely in favor 
of the Court and disappointed that President Carter had not asked the Senate to consider accepting 
the Court’s jurisdiction. Walter Landry, who served on the delegation to the American 
Convention’s drafting, said, “I think eventually we should accept the jurisdiction of the court. 
Again, I think we should move toward a viable, enforceable hemispheric human rights system, 
                                                
114 Senate Hearings, 1979, 113. 
115 Id., 237. 
116 See Chapter Four, section titled “H1 Implications.” 
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such as is present in Western Europe.”117 In response, Senator and Chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee Claiborne Pell responded that he agreed.118 Because of the absence of 
H1.b.iii, the implication fails its test; as this was a Straw-in-the-Wind test, the implication’s failure 
is only slight evidence against H1. 
In sum, H1 — that the United States’ uneven engagement in the American Convention is 
a symptom of tensions between Restraint and Imposition Approaches to norm exportation — is 
somewhat supported. Though H1.a passes both of its associated tests with a great amount of 
evidence, its results are not wholly conclusive, given they rely on the certain, but not unique, Hoop 
test. H1.b, targeting Imposition sentiments, likewise finds some support through a Hoop test. 
Additionally, the presence of evidence reflecting a Smoking-Gun implication is promising. 
However, given the selection effects that may be present in the Senate Hearings themselves, the 
Smoking-Gun implication does not pass on its own. 
Testing Substantive Limitations 
 Articulated in Chapter Three, the Substantive Limitations Argument postulated that the 
United States failed to ratify the American Convention on Human Rights because there are 
inconsistencies between the U.S.’s domestic law and the Convention’s provisions. This 
inconsistency, according to the scholarship, is most attributable to Article 4 of the American 
Convention, which establishes that the right to life, “shall be protected by law and, in general, from 
the moment of conception.”119 The United States’ domestic policies on abortion and the death 
                                                
117 Senate Hearings, 1979, 258. This is an example of a quote appearing in Appendix C, though not 
strictly used to update belief of the hypothesis. 
118 Id., 259. 
119 American Convention on Human Rights, Article 4. 
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penalty conflict with the Convention’s articulation of the right to life. Slightly modified from the 
original formulation of the Substantive Limitations Argument for the sake of consistency with 
other hypotheses, H2 contends that the U.S.’s uneven engagement with the American Convention 
on Human Rights is due to substantive limitations, especially Article 4, That is, that American 
Convention provisions are inconsistent with U.S.’s domestic law. Given the analysis of this study, 
the Substantive Limitations Argument appears to be largely unfounded. 
 The first predicted implication of H2, H2.i, is that the United States appears to genuinely 
intend to ratify the Convention prior to the finalization of the Article 4 language. After this 
moment, it was expected the United States would not be as eager to ratify the Convention. This 
proved to be false. In 1959, the Organization of American States held its 5th Meeting of the 
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Santiago, Chile where they passed a resolution for 
the preparation of a draft human rights convention. Attached to the final act of the meeting, 
detailing the resulting resolutions, the United States included the following statement:  
The United States, as is well known, has since its birth as a nation strongly defended human 
rights. The promotion of respect for human rights in the inter-American system is therefore 
supported by the United States. While the United States, because of the structure of its 
Federal Government, does not find it possible to enter into multilateral conventions 
with respect to human rights or with respect to an Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, it, of course, raises no objection to other states’ entering into conventions on these 
subjects should they find it possible to do so. Accordingly, while the United States has 
voted in favor of Resolution VIII, Human Rights, it reserves its position with respect to its 
participation in the instruments or organisms that may evolve.120 
 
Given that the United States appears to have rejected the idea of ratifying a future draft 
Convention — nearly a decade before Article 4, or any other provision, was finalized — H2.i fails 
its Smoking Gun test. It is not substantive provisions that appear to bear on the United States’ 
uneven engagement. In fact, the United States’ 1959 statement appears to lend credibility to H1 
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and H3, reflecting similar language as predicted and found in the 1979 Senate Hearings: concerns 
about protecting federalism and avoiding intervention from the Inter-American Court. It also 
greatly supports the argument that scholars should consider U.S. engagement with human rights 
in terms of unevenness and not merely a failure to ratify. In isolation, it appears that all possibilities 
for U.S. ratification of the American Convention were rejected in 1959. Yet, under the leadership 
of a Restraint-minded president, participation in the Convention is called for and reconsidered. 
However, given that H2.i was probed with a Smoking Gun test, the failure of H2.i provides only 
slight evidence against H2 and more consideration is necessary. The second, third, and fourth 
predicted implications for H2 are once again tested with the 1979 Senate Hearings. 
Implication H2.ii predicted that statements would be made arguing that Article 4 prevented 
the United States from being able to ratify the American Convention. Of all the witnesses 
interviewed during the Senate Hearings, not one witness took such a high degree of issue with 
Article 4. Rather, Article 4 was occasionally mentioned in passing; for example, the American Bar 
Association’s statement briefly mentions it, stating, “Article 4 (Right to Life) is probably the most 
troublesome article in the Convention and a U.S. reservation with respect to portions of the Article 
will very likely be necessary because of its restrictions on the death penalty and on abortion.”121 
However, no statements were made implying that Article 4 was a sufficient concern for not 
ratifying the American Convention; it appeared, rather, to be a secondary concern and generally 
quelled by the State Department’s proposed reservation to Article 4. 
Interestingly, Article 4 was more often applauded than met with concern. For example, 
Senator Jesse Helms, who argued against ratification, allowed that “should the Convention be 
ratified, I believe it would be entirely appropriate for the Supreme Court to reconsider the entire 
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issue of abortion and how its past interpretations of the Constitution would be affected by such an 
international recognition of personhood.”122 This is particularly odd in light of statements made 
earlier in the hearings by Senator Helms. As an example, Senator Helms at one point, in 
commending Phyllis Schlafly for her testimony, commented, “I take it that you are concerned 
about the vagueness of some of these provisions which invite interpretations potentially adverse 
to the sovereignty of this country.”123 After Schlafly replied affirmatively, Helms asserts that he 
agrees with her. Although Senator Helms is apparently disturbed by the possibility that vague 
provisions could result in violations of sovereignty, he calls for the vague Article 4 provision to be 
the basis for a Supreme Court decision overturning Roe v. Wade. This position does not seem 
entirely consistent and, though not central to the discussion at hand, it may lend support to the idea 
that human rights is “more of a political than a legal question.”124 Ultimately, however, H2.ii fails 
its Smoking Gun test, lending slight evidence against H2. 
H2.iii, that statements will be made claiming that the recommended RUDs to the American 
Convention are insufficient to overcome substantive inconsistencies, was assigned a narrow Hoop 
test. Some statements somewhat reflected this sentiment. For example,  Phyllis Schlafly, the 
conservative activist, asserts that, “Even if all those addenda were binding, they would not 
safeguard the rights of Americans from most of the dangers posed by the treaties.”125 She does not 
appear concerned about the treaty provisions requiring U.S. observation of higher human rights 
norms, however; instead, she claims, “the treaties imperil or restrict existing rights of Americans 
by using treaty law to restrict or reduce U.S. constitutional rights.”126 
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Concerns were not common over reservations being sufficient to temper articles in their 
substance. Much more common was concern over the non-self-executing declaration 
recommended. For example, Chairman Pell recalls a Supreme Court decision and implies 
international legal provisions may impact domestic law, stating, “It says that unless the reservation 
is an integral part of the treaty, which obviously is not because then it would be an amendment, 
then the judiciary would not be bound under the supremacy clause.”127 This statement, and Phyllis 
Schlafly’s, suggests that the heart of the substance issue is not whether the American Convention 
is substantively consistent, but whether international interference may be made possible in light of 
inconsistencies. Interference, not substance, seems to be at the core of concerns. Because 
statements made about the insufficiency of RUDs were not made in terms of inconsistency but in 
terms of interference, H2.iii fails its narrow Hoop test, providing somewhat strong evidence 
against it. 
Lastly, H2.iv, which predicted that statements that U.S. law is overall not consistent with 
the American Convention, is also tested with a narrow Hoop test. There was little evidence that 
witnesses viewed U.S. domestic law to be inconsistent with the American Convention as a whole. 
In fact, many statements were made to the contrary, such as Roberts Owen, State Department legal 
advisor, who claimed  that the American Convention “roughly correspond[s], in terms of 
international law, to the Bill of Rights, which is so firmly entrenched in our Constitution.”128 
Others spoke more generally of all the treaties considered during the Senate hearings, with 
international lawyer Morton Skylar asserting that, “these human rights treaties which you are 
considering are not other people's laws. They are our own laws.”129 
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On only two occasions did witnesses take direct issue with the American Convention’s 
consistency with U.S. law. Philip Anderegg claimed the Convention contained “issues concerning 
the qualifications of voters, access to civil service, and corporal punishment.”130 Separately, 
Norman Redlich, Dean of New York University Law School, contends that the Convention 
“permits broad exceptions to the rights of assembly and association and permits government 
censorship and punishment of expression which would be entirely inconsistent with the American 
Constitution,” though he goes on to recommend a reservation be added to remedy these 
inconsistencies.131 Because, unlike H2.iii, these statements are discussed purely in terms of 
substantive inconsistency, and not primarily intervention, H2.iv passes its narrow Hoop test, 
providing some support for H2 
Despite this source of support, I conclude that the Substantive Limitations Argument is 
largely unsubstantiated. Substance was not at the core of opponents’ contention with ratification 
of the American Convention and, even where substantive inconsistencies were raised, they were 
not framed as justifications for not ratifying. Rather, they were raised to suggest an additional 
reservation before ratification. Overwhelmingly, witnesses voiced that the American Convention 
is entirely consistent with domestic law and “give[s] expression to human rights that coincide with 
our own laws and practices.”132 
Bricker Amendment: A moment or momentum? 
 The Bricker Amendment Argument argues that the United States’ uneven engagement with 
the American Convention results from concerns raised by the proposed Bricker Amendment to the 
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U.S. Constitution. These concerns are that international agreements can interfere with U.S. 
sovereignty, its federalist system, and issues that should be left to domestic jurisdiction. The first 
predicted implication of this hypothesis, H3.i, was that opponents to ratification would explicitly 
invoke the Bricker Amendment, or the period it was considered during, to argue against ratifying 
the American Convention. This implication was assigned a Smoking Gun test. Contrary to my 
expectation that H3.i would not be observed, the Bricker Amendment was explicitly mentioned a 
handful of times throughout the Senate Hearings, though not by opponents of ratification. Mention 
of the Bricker Amendment came from proponents of ratification who often claimed that the 
concerns the Bricker Amendment sought to address were not consequential. For example, 
President of the American Association for the International Commission of Jurists, William Butler 
reflected, “We have come a long way since the days of Senator Bricker when, in 1954, the so-
called Bricker amendment failed to pass the Senate by only one vote.”133 Another witness, Covey 
Oliver, noted that there were still some individuals stuck in the Bricker mindset: “Lingering 
memories of Bricker have a great deal to do, I think, with fears of the sort we have heard today, 
that the human rights conventions might require us to do ‘something terrible.’”134 However, like 
Butler, Oliver ultimately asserted that most have moved beyond this attitude. To the extent that 
they explicitly acknowledge Bricker as the source of concerns held by contemporary opponents to 
ratification, these statements reflect the implication H3.i. Therefore, H3.i passes the Smoking Gun 
test, providing strong support for H3. 
 Implication H3.ii, probed with a Hoop test, predicts statements reflecting the so-called 
Bricker concerns themselves, arguing that ratification would threaten U.S. sovereignty, its 
federalist system, and its jurisdiction over domestic matters. There were several statements made 
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to this effect. Roberts Owen, in recounting common arguments against ratification, noted, “it is 
said that the human rights treaties could serve to change our laws as they are, allowing individuals 
in courts of law to invoke the treaty terms where inconsistent with domestic law or even with the 
Constitution.”135 Phyllis Schlafly asserted, “It is obvious… that the treaties are incompatible with 
the United States Constitution, would override precious American rights, would interfere with our 
domestic law and matters of private concern, and would upset the distribution of power in our 
system of federalism.”136 Many statements reflecting the predicted H3.ii implication also counted 
as evidence for the H1 implication that witnesses would express concern over unnecessary or 
unwanted intervention (H1.b.i), which was anticipated in light of the argument that the Bricker 
Amendment is a symptom of the Restraint-Imposition tension. Nevertheless, the statements 
support H3.ii on its own, and it therefore passes the Hoop test, providing support for H3. 
 Lastly, H3.iii predicted that Bricker Amendment concerns would not feature as primary 
concerns in U.S. consideration of League of Nations membership given that the League of Nations 
was considered thirty years before the Bricker Amendment. This implication is particularly 
important, as it is both a unique and certain implication of H3, assigning it the standard of the 
Doubly Decisive test. The first document analyzed for this implication was the set of fourteen 
reservations proposed by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge to the Treaty of Versailles, which provided 
for the League. 
Four reservations are particularly relevant for this analysis. Lodge’s first reservation 
reserved judgement solely to the United States for “whether all its international obligations and all 
its obligations under the said Covenant have been fulfilled.”137 The fourth reservation dealt with 
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the matter of domestic jurisdiction, assigning the United States the exclusive “right to decide what 
matters are within the domestic jurisdiction.”138 The reservation additionally “declares that all 
domestic and political questions relating wholly or in part to its internal affairs… are solely within 
the jurisdiction of the United States and are not under this treaty to be submitted to arbitration” or 
to judgment by the League of Nations.139 Likewise, Lodge’s fifth reservation rejects any 
questioning of the United States’ Monroe Doctrine: “said doctrine is to be interpreted by the United 
States alone and is hereby declared to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said League of 
Nations…”140 Lastly, Lodge’s fourteenth reservation ascertains that, “The United States assumes 
no obligation to be bound by any election, decision, report, or finding of the [League of Nations] 
Council or Assembly” or “arising out of any dispute between the United States and any member 
of the League.”141 
 Although approaching the issue with different words, all four reservations — reflecting the 
reservations proposed to the American Convention and commonly attached to other human rights 
agreements — aim to halt any possibility for international examination, scrutiny, or interference. 
Like the Bricker Amendment, the reservations take the teeth out of the agreement in the name of 
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that there should be no further European expansion in the West and that any violation of this principle 
would be an affront to the United States. Although spoken by President James Monroe in 1823, many 
argue that it was the imagining of John Adams, who sought to the United States’ own “sphere of 
influence.” In its messaging, it was framed as a moralistic policy, protecting fundamental values of 
freedom and protecting newly sovereign Latin American states so that they would not be re-colonized by 
European powers. Scholarship widely accepts that the Doctrine was reimagined by President Theodore 
Roosevelt, establishing the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and asserting the right of the 
United States to be an “international police power.” Reflecting the Imposition Approach argued for in this 
thesis, President Roosevelt asserted that intervention was warranted in “flagrant cases of wrongdoing or 
impotence” which “ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation.” See Monroe 1823, 
Roosevelt 1905, Murphy 2005, Sexton 2011, Gilderhus 2006, and Scarfi 2016. 
141 Lodge 1919. 
LEADER OF RIGHTS? 
75 
protecting domestic jurisdiction and, ultimately, sovereignty. The scope of Senator Lodge’s 
fourteen reservations, including and beyond the four named above, were deemed by President 
Wilson to amount to the “nullification of the treaty,” reflecting similar sentiments expressed by 
proponents of ratification of the American Convention on Human Rights.142 
 As with the Bricker Amendment, protecting federalism was also a concern for the 
opponents of the League of Nations. In his speech before the Senate, Senator William Borah saw 
the League as creating “executive functions” that would result in action through the League 
“without the authority of Congress.”143 Senator Borah went on to affirm that the United States 
must “be permitted to live her own life” and that “all schemes, all plans, however ambitious and 
fascinating they seem in their proposal, but which would embarrass or entangle and impede or 
shackle her sovereign will, which would compromise her freedom of action, I unhesitatingly put 
behind me.”144 
Senator Lodge’s reservations and Senator Borah’s speech are not outliers in their 
opposition to possible international intervention. Scholars have noted this pattern of concern within 
the League debates as a whole. Historian David Mervin accounts that senators in opposition to the 
League “refused to entertain the possibility of surrendering one whit of American sovereignty to 
any international organization.”145 He goes on to depict the opposition as insistent “on the utter 
inviolability of American sovereignty and the sanctity of the Monroe Doctrine; they extolled 
nationalism and poured scorn on internationalism.”146 Political Scientist Gyung-Ho Jeong’s 
characterization of the debate agrees with Mervin in this regard. He acknowledges that those 
                                                
142 See Letter from Wilson, which is also available in Lodge 1919. Sentiments reflecting Wilson’s 
frustration over the treaty being nullified by reservations are available in Appendix D. 
143 Borah 1919, available in Byrd 1994, 570 
144 Id., 573. 
145 Mervin 1971, 209. 
146 Id., 210. 
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Senate Republicans who would have otherwise accepted the Treaty of Versailles peace terms, 
“supported a unilateral or nationalist foreign policy stance [and therefore] had issues with the 
commitment to a multilateral supranational organization.”147 
Given the sentiments in primary sources and the analysis of secondary source accounts of 
the League of Nations debate, the presence of sovereignty, federalism, and domestic jurisdiction 
concerns is supported. Due to this evidence, H3.iii fails its Doubly Decisive test, resulting in strong 
evidence against H3: that the United States’ uneven engagement with the American Convention is 
due to concerns raised by the Bricker Amendment. However, the consequence is a puzzle: how do 
we reconcile the support found for H3.i — that the Senate Hearings would attach opposition 
explicitly to the Bricker Amendment — and the evidence found against H3.ii — which weakens 
the Bricker Amendment Argument greatly? I suggest that, although the Bricker Amendment 
proposal may have been more salient to those who bore witness in Senate hearings in 1979, the 
Bricker Amendment is a symptom of a cause and not the cause itself. In this thesis, I have 
suggested this cause may be the tension between Restraint-Imposition. However, the Bricker 
Amendment proposal is not entirely insignificant. The assertion may be too strong that it is the 
defining moment in how the United States considers human rights agreements. But, if not a 
moment, the Bricker Amendment proposal certainly gave momentum to sovereignty concerns and 
language with which to express them in the context of human rights. 
  
                                                
147 Jeong 2017, 328. 
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Chapter Six 
LIMITATIONS 
 The study undertaken by this thesis is limited in a number of ways. First is the question of 
the selection effect discussed in the previous chapter with regard to the witnesses heard during the 
1979 Senate Hearings. Although diverse testimony was heard in support of ratification of the 
American Convention, the voices in opposition were limited and perhaps not representative of the 
reasoning generally held against ratification. This possibility is reinforced by another limitation: 
the amount of sources available on which to draw for analysis of positions in favor or against 
American Convention ratification. For example, I was unable to find a debate among Senators 
themselves. 
 Another limitation regards the selection of a case for H3.iii. Had a human rights agreement 
been considered prior to the Bricker Amendment and more distanced than the Genocide 
Convention, that would have been a preferable case comparison. However, this was a challenge in 
light of the development of international human rights law being largely a post-World War II 
phenomenon. Additionally, because the study is a case, it cannot provide any broadly conclusive 
results as to the theory developed in Chapter Two, though limited results do indicate promise for 
future study. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has considered why the United States has been systematically uneven in its 
engagement with international human rights agreements. The response developed in this work uses 
traditional notions of liberal theory to articulate two competing approaches to the promotion of 
human rights. The Restraint Approach is argued to pull the United States in the direction of 
international cooperation through institutions, such as the American Convention on Human Rights. 
However, while the Restraint Approach may move the needle in this direction, the Imposition 
Approach is argued to reject such international cooperation on the grounds that the United States 
is fine as is and should retain its power to impose itself in exceptional cases of rights abuses if it 
sees fit. The result of this theorized tension is an impasse which is observed as uneven engagement. 
However, instances of domestic impasse in foreign policy are not observed strictly within 
the realm of human rights. The League of Nations is another case where individuals seeking 
international institutional cooperation were met with those who preferred to preserve the United 
States’ autonomy to decide where and when intervention would be of interest. The resulting 
standoff between President Woodrow Wilson and Henry Cabot Lodge’s coalition of senators led 
to yet another impasse as Wilson encouraged Senate Democrats to vote against a Treaty of 
Versailles nullified by Lodge’s reservations. This dynamic, in addition to the rejection of the idea 
that sovereignty concerns in treaty ratification arose from the Bricker Amendment, results in a 
promising possibility for future study. Future work might assess other instances of United States 
foreign policy consideration to provide more insight into the possibility of the Restraint-Imposition 
tension hypothesis. In particular, further study is necessary to assess the linkage between the 
isolationist and interventionist undercurrents of the Imposition mindset. 
LEADER OF RIGHTS? 
79 
Reflection 
Throughout reading the testimony of Senate hearing witnesses, one word reappeared with 
frequency, much to my surprise: leader. Despite frequent voicing of disappointment over the 
United States’ apparent apprehension towards human rights, its weakening of potential human 
rights commitments through reservations, and, most shockingly, its delay in ratifying the 1948 
Genocide Convention, time-and-time again, witnesses asserted that the U.S. was nevertheless a 
leader, even a “champion,” of human rights.148 Why, in the midst of uneven engagement, is this 
view held?  
The analysis of this work bears on this question. One impression apparent from the Senate 
hearings is that, though the United States may not consistently sign on the dotted line of human 
rights agreements, there are those within the United States who nonetheless remain deeply 
committed to the cause of human rights. Indeed, there are those who suggested in their testimony 
that the promotion of human rights should be understood as part of the national identity of the 
United States. These, and perhaps not the United States as a monolith, are the leaders of human 
rights. While this commitment and belief in human rights remains among the people, the 
possibility, if not always the actualization, of U.S. human rights leadership remains very much 
alive. The question mark in the title of this thesis remains for this reason.  
                                                
148 Senate Hearings 1979, 351 and 407. 
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APPENDIX 
A. Hypotheses and Predicted Implications 
Hypothesis and 
Implication 
Evidence Type 
H1.a.i Statements claiming that participation in the American Convention will 
improve the United States’ ability to promote human rights norms. 
H1.a.ii Statements claiming the United States will miss out on the opportunity to 
influence the protection and practice of human rights by not ratifying the 
American Convention. *something about credibility*??? 
H1.b.i Statements claiming that participating in the American Convention will open 
the United States to unnecessary or unwanted intervention in U.S. 
domestic affairs. 
H1.b.ii Statements claiming that ratifying the Convention will not increase U.S. 
influence in human rights beyond what it already is. 
H1.b.iii Statements expressing concern over the possibility of the U.S. being taken 
to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
H2.i The United States appears to intend to ratify the American Convention until 
the language of Article 4 is finalized and includes “in general, from the 
moment of conception.” 
H2.ii Statements identifying Article 4 as the reason why the United States cannot 
ratify. 
H2.iii Statements arguing that the reservations, understandings, and 
declarations are not sufficient to overcome inconsistencies with U.S. 
domestic law. 
H2.iv Statements claiming that the United States’ domestic law does not align 
with the American Convention’s provisions. 
H3.i Explicitly invoking the Bricker Amendment or the period it was proposed 
to argue in opposition to ratification of the American Convention. 
H3.ii Statements claiming that ratifying the American Convention would be a 
threat to the United States’ sovereignty, federalist system, or jurisdiction 
over domestic matters. 
H3.iii The arguments against joining the League of Nations are not expressed in 
terms of the concerns of the Bricker Amendment (i.e. protecting sovereignty, 
the U.S. federalist system, or the U.S.’s jurisdiction over its domestic 
matters). 
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B. Collected Statements from 1979 Senate Hearings 
 
H1.a.i: 
 
Quote 
No. Statement Actor 
Page 
# 
1 
"Concern for human rights is one of the foundations of the greatness of our Nation. Our 
observance of human rights contributes profoundly to our leadership in the international 
community as a whole. To preserve and enhance that leadership role, we must 
demonstrate our willingness to make human rights a matter of international commitment 
and policy and not solely a matter of domestic law." 
Warren 
Christopher 28 
2 
"On the contrary, ratification would encourage the extension of rights already enjoyed by 
our citizens to the citizens of other nations and, very significantly, it would allow the United 
States to participate in this process." 
Warren 
Christopher 28 
3 
"Ratification also would give the United States an additional international forum in which to 
pursue the advancement of human rights. It would enable us to challenge other nations to 
meet the high standards set by the United States. We should not deny ourselves the 
opportunity to help shape the developing international standards for human rights and to 
encourage the extension to others of the rights we long have enjoyed." 
Warren 
Christopher 29 
4 
"Human rights are not peripheral to the foreign policy of the United States... Our pursuit of 
human rights is part of a broad effort to use our great power and our tremendous influence 
in the service of creating a better world â€” a world in which human beings can live in 
peace, in freedom, and with their basic needs adequately met." 
Jimmy 
Carter 
(quoted by 
WC) 
31 
5 "...one principle goal of these treaties is to bring about a modification in the behavior of other governments in ways that directly affect our own national interest." 
Roberts 
Owen 34 
6 "I am here today to support ratification of these treaties as a means for the United States to participate in the furtherance of similar rights in the international sphere." 
Roberts 
Owen 36 
7 "...the United States would do well to participate and thus have a role in the development of an international jurisprudence of human rights." 
Roberts 
Owen 41 
8 
"[Ratification] will encourage other countries to join those which have already accepted the 
treaties. And, in countries where human rights generally are not respected, it will aid 
citizens in raising human rights issues." 
Patricia 
Derian 42 
9 
"In the Western Hemisphere, the Inter-American Human Rights Court has been 
established to hear disputes and an Inter-American Human Rights Commission has been 
established to conduct investigations of abuses. By ratifying the American Human Rights 
Convention, we will be eligible to nominate and vote for their members, which we are not 
eligible to do now." 
Patricia 
Derian 43 
10 
"Becoming a party to the treaties will enable the United States to participate more fully in 
the human rights dialog at the UN and the OAS. We will have standing to discuss the 
records of other nations where it is appropriate to do so." 
Jack 
Goldklang 47 
11 
"Mr. Chairman, ratification of these treaties will be fully consistent with an important goal of 
the United States in promoting human rights in the world, and failure to ratify these treaties 
will be inconsistent with that important foreign policy goal." 
John 
Norton 
Moore 
76 
12 
"...the ratification of these four treaties would encourage the progressive development of a 
variety of institutional mechanisms which would seek to protect human rights around the 
world." 
John 
Norton 
Moore 
76 
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Quote 
No. 
Statement Actor Page 
# 
13 
"As a member of the American Convention on Human Rights, we would be able to 
participate in the nomination and election of judges and in the system for the new Inter-
American Court on Human Rights. In the absence of that, Mr. Chairman, it has been rather 
interesting that an American citizen appointed to that court was nominated and appointed 
by a foreign nation. It certainly would seem appropriate for the United States to be a direct 
participant in the nomination and election of judges to the Inter-American Court on Human 
Rights." 
John 
Norton 
Moore 
76 
14 
"The provisions of the treaties are consonant with, and a projection of our democratic 
values. There ought not be any ambiguity about that in the mind of anybody in the world. 
The more firmly those values can be imbedded in international law and international 
values, the better off we will be as a democracy." 
Tom Kahn 93 
15 
"But in others, you will, I hope, consider deferring to a judgment, broadly shared by our 
Hemispheric neighbors, that some refinement of United States practice will contribute to 
the defense of human rights. True allegiance to the cause of human rights requires a 
measure of humility. If a society such as we are, committed by its traditions and way of life 
to the defense of human rights, cannot in the smallest measure defer to the general 
opinion of mankind where that opinion recognizes a higher standard than we have yet 
achieved, what can we expect of states where human rights is an aspiration not of 
governments but of the peoples over whom they reign?" 
Thomas 
Farer 108 
16 
"So, it seems to me that our acceptance of the idea of external assessment, which is what 
accepting these conventions amounts to, can have a constructive long-term impact on this 
antique attitude about the propriety or impropriety of countries and individuals looking into 
the human lights behavior, of other states." 
Thomas 
Farer 111 
17 
"The four conventions before you today and the Genocide Convention are not needed to 
conform American law to more just human rights ends and I stress the word "ends" but to 
align us with the "good side" in world affairs and give us the credibility we now lack as we 
use our influence to promote human rights." 
Covey 
Oliver 128 
18 
"I would hope that the United States can become a party to these covenants so that we, 
too, can participate in bringing a discussion of human rights to the forefront in every part of 
the world." 
George 
Miller 141 
19 "I think the act of ratification by a country such as the United States is a very clear and long-lasting statement to the world about the importance that we do place on this." 
George 
Miller 146 
20 
"I think our participation in the working committees and the ongoing discussion, in the 
reviews and the audits of countries' positions in regard to human rights, would take on 
much greater meaning. Perhaps we would be in a much better position to shape that policy 
and the determinations as to violations." 
George 
Miller 146 
21 
"…it will bring to the forefront the discussion and it will lend credence to those countries 
which already have ratified these in the interest of pursuing human dignity and human 
rights." 
George 
Miller 146 
22 "But if our ratification is in the interest of pursuing these goals, then our voice can be heard in that organization and in the working groups in the shaping of that policy." 
George 
Miller 146 
23 
"We will be respected for our honesty and we will have a legally enforceable Convention 
with teeth in it, one that can help to protect the human rights of individual Americans living 
and traveling in other countries of this hemisphere." 
Walter 
Landry 251 
24 "…it is in the national interest of the United States to encourage and promote universal respect for and observance of human rights." 
ABA 
statement 251 
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Quote 
No. 
Statement Actor Page 
# 
25 
"By virtue of its size, population, and wealth, the United States is frequently regarded as 
the leader of the Inter-American System. It should certainly assert that leadership by 
signing and ratifying the American Convention on Human Rights which has been urged by 
the Latin American countries and which represents essentially, the affirmation of 
fundamental U.S. political ideas on a hemispheric basis." 
ABA 
statement 254 
26 "There is pressing need for expanding respect for law and the individual beyond our borders." 
ABA 
statement 254 
27 
"As a leader of the hemisphere, prompt action by the United States could advance the 
entry into force of the American Convention by several years. Latin American States are 
notoriously slow in ratifying Inter-American treaties and they often await the lead of the 
United States." 
ABA 
statement 254 
28 
"I think we should welcome the opportunity to state the American case, and the American 
record for freedom, in any international tribunal anywhere in the world. One of the chief 
reasons why we urge consent to ratification is to give us entree into those channels." 
Norman 
Redlich 260 
29 "It provides us the opportunity through the enforcement process to hold other governments to that standard. It will be an important addition to our foreign policy in this area." 
Norman 
Redlich 261 
30 
"The United States has had some success in raising the level of moral discourse in world 
affairs... Ratification of the covenants on human rights is a logical further step in providing 
additional implements for advancing individuals rights." 
Norman 
Redlich 263 
31 
"These covenants can then become an important adjunct to those programs and policies 
already operated unilaterally by the United States in seeking to raise the universal 
standard of human rights." 
Norman 
Redlich 263 
32 
"Obtaining human rights observance abroad is not just part of our moral values. It is vitally 
connected to our national self-interest in securing a higher level of commitment and 
practice from other nations in support of the basic principles that underlie the human rights 
treaties : Rights of free speech, equal protection under laws, right of assembly, fair trial, 
economic and job security are all the rights that are the basic cornerstones of our own 
democratic system." 
Morton 
Skylar 272 
32 
“The ability of our own values to survive is damaged when these values are not observed 
by other governments. But we are in a very poor position to press for these values abroad, 
to alert countries of their violations and to suggest improvements so long as we ourselves 
are seen to be in basic noncompliance. 
Morton 
Skyler 272 
33 
"Isn't it time that we shed this reluctance to acknowledge our strengths, our capabilities for 
achieving reform? Isn't it time we stand up in the world community for the values that are 
most important to our own people, both in their exercise of them here and in our ability to 
maintain the viability of our values and our system in a world community that too often 
deviates from these values in the treatment of its own citizens?" 
Morton 
Skylar 273 
34 
"How much more appropriate, more rational, and more in support of our worldwide and 
national interests would it be to say instead that we readily acknowledge, through 
ratification, what is fundamental to the American system and to our commitment to law and 
justice. Ratification is the first step necessary for us to begin to work with all nations in 
giving greater meaning to these principles both here and abroad." 
Morton 
Skylar 273 
35 "…ratification supports our government's efforts to secure human rights observance in other nations." 
Washington 
Helsinki 
Watch 
Committee 
274 
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No. 
Statement Actor Page 
# 
36 
"One of the great weaknesses of our efforts to promote international human rights in the 
past has been that it has been done unilaterally, through the use of foreign aid cut-offs and 
military sales embargoes. How much more effective and less potentially damaging to our 
foreign policy interests to make the vehicle for observance and enforcement international 
rather than unilateral." 
Washington 
Helsinki 
Watch 
Committee 
275 
37 "Ratification lessens the opportunity for other nations to criticize the status of our own country's compliance problems." 
Washington 
Helsinki 
Watch 
Committee 
275 
38 
"In the interests of further advancement of human rights conditions in our own country, as 
well as an improved ability to promote human rights observance abroad, we urge your 
Committee to report to the Senate in favor of prompt ratification, with a minimum of 
restrictive reservations.” 
Washington 
Helsinki 
Watch 
Committee 
276 
39 
"We can assure the United States that full participation in the international human rights 
legal system could only benefit this country and its citizens and certainly would influence 
further development and implementation of human rights laws and procedures to the 
benefit of others." 
Harry 
Inman 278 
40 
"Accession to the four human rights treaties is certainly called for at this time as a signal to 
the international community that the United States' historic commitment to human dignity 
and freedom continues to forge our domestic and foreign policy." 
Harry 
Inman 278 
41 "Ratification of the human rights treaties certainly will strengthen the confidence and stature of our nation." 
Harry 
Inman 278 
42 
"Because of the high emotional appeal of human rights language and its operational 
function in international law, we cannot afford to abandon these concepts to the enemies 
of freedom. But this long-term semantic struggle will be waged in the implementation 
organs set up by these treaties, which argues for a responsible American voice in these 
fora." 
Oscar 
Garibaldi 334 
43 
"…it is up to the United States to get in and participate in the development not only of the 
remedies but of the substantive law under all of the conventions that are being 
considered." 
Richard 
Lillich 336 
44 
"But it cannot be doubted that American human rights policies would be viewed with less 
suspicion in the hemisphere and would be less open to the charge of hypocrisy if the 
United States headed the list of nations that had ratified the convention." 
Thomas 
Buergenthal 339 
45 
"…because of its special ties to and interest in the Western Hemisphere, it would be of 
particular importance for the United States to become part of the inter-American system for 
the protection of human rights and to do everything in its power to ensure that this system 
succeeds." 
Thomas 
Buergenthal 339 
46 
"Because of the institutions the convention establishes, this treaty has a strong potential of 
providing a foundation for the gradual democratization of Latin America. That is a goal to 
which the United States is committed and which certainly is in the long-term interests of 
the United States.” 
Thomas 
Buergenthal 339 
47 
"It would also help to ensure continued U.S. influence in a part of the world on which the 
U.S. will increasingly have to rely as its traditional political and economic ties with countries 
in other regions become more tenuous." 
Thomas 
Buergenthal 342 
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48 
"…if a system of standards, such as those embodied in these treaties, does have a 
reasonable chance to survive and flourish and to gather strength in the long term, that 
chance very probably depends directly on our own vigorous participation in the effort." 
John 
Lawrence 
Hargrove 
345 
49 "I hope it will not be regarded as chauvinistic to impute a critical role to the United States in the future evolution of international human rights." 
John 
Lawrence 
Hargrove 
346 
50 
"…we as a people should have enough confidence in our own competence, our political 
acumen, our staying power, and, above all, in the inherent attractive force of our own basic 
values, to commit ourselves fully to the task of the sound development of these four 
regimes." 
John 
Lawrence 
Hargrove 
346 
51 
"Yet unless these mechanisms are grounded on a foundation of solid commitment by 
sympathetically disposed governments to the integrity of the treaty regimes, their practical 
significance will be permanently truncated and circumscribed." 
John 
Lawrence 
Hargrove 
349 
52 
"The United States own national interests very much are tied up in the human rights 
movement, as are the United States interests in a system of world order and peace, of 
which human rights invariably must be a condition." 
Jerome 
Shestack 351 
53 
"We... strongly urge the Senate of the United States to ratify these treaties to maintain a 
position of credibility and to enable the United States better to perform the critical role of 
champion and advocate of human rights which so well suits this country and is so 
important to human dignity and the well-being of the world." 
Jerome 
Shestack 351 
54 
"Because the League views the United States role as an advocate of human rights to be of 
critical importance in advancing the cause of human rights, we view United States 
ratification of these treaties as an action of utmost priority." 
Jerome 
Shestack 351 
55 
"It establishes a reconstituted Hemispheric Commission on Human Rights and creates a 
new Inter-American Court on Human Rights. These bodies permit the United States to 
contribute to the development of a multilateral institution on a regional level and to take on 
a position of leadership in the hemisphere." 
Jerome 
Shestack 352 
56 "Expansion of United States international obligations in the area of human rights will surely serve to confirm the leadership role of this nation in human rights." 
Jerome 
Shestack 254 
57 
"We join with all peoples in the quest for justice, in the fashioning of institutions that secure 
the creation of those basic conditions that will assure the universal observance of human 
rights." 
William 
Wipfler 364 
58 
"We believe that U.S. ratification of these covenants and conventions... will enhance the 
observance of human rights throughout the world and within our own country. 
Furthermore, it will give an increased dimension of credibility to U.S. efforts for the 
improvement of human rights." 
William 
Wipfler 365 
59 
"As President Carter stated in his transmittal message, Senate advice and consent will 
confirm our country's traditional commitment to the promotion and protection of human 
rights at home and abroad." 
Donald 
McHenry 407 
60 
"…ratification will enable our Government more effectively to protest serious human rights 
violations in other countries. Such protest would be especially appropriate with respect to 
those governments which have ratified the treaties but pay no heed to their provisions." 
Sidney 
Liskofsky 411 
61 
"…it is our belief that U.S. ratification of these covenants will strengthen the stature of the 
covenants and will enhance their international authority so that their provisions will become 
more likely to be observed by all governments." 
John Houck 419 
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62 
"I think it would add an incremental force to the effort to secure change over time. The U.S. 
participation in the international processes through the committees and the reporting 
procedures existing under these treaties would be a positive factor." 
Sidney 
Liskofsky 428 
63 "I would anticipate that U.S. ratification would be conducive over the long term to, hopefully, changing those practices." 
Sidney 
Liskofsky 428 
64 
"I can only assure you that the U.S. section of Amnesty International and those working 
here in the United States would be extremely grateful and believe their hands would be 
strengthened enormously by U.S. ratification." 
David 
Hinkley 430 
65 
"Every ratification, and certainly the ratification of a country with the enormous moral 
suasion and political and economic power of the United States only can enhance the 
international fabric of human rights protections." 
David 
Hinkley 431 
66 
"…it substantially would increase the international consensus among states, thereby 
strengthening the international law of human rights which, in turn, would influence other 
states to take like decisions." 
William 
Butler 458 
67 
"…it substantially would strengthen the international machinery for the protection of human 
rights by providing for a system of reporting and review wherein the United States could 
make a substantial contribution." 
William 
Butler 458 
68 
"…it would confirm to the world that the United States firmly is committed to the universal 
protection of human rights, not only for the rest of the world, but for its own citizens, as 
well." 
William 
Butler 458 
69 
"the United States would be committing its power and prestige to the goals of realizing for 
all peoples of the world a decent government, a fruitful life for all individuals, goals for 
which our own country was created to secure for its own citizens." 
William 
Butler 458 
70 
"Law will give us the opportunity to influence other nations. It will give us fora, as does the 
Helsinki accords, in which we can confront our opponents and hopefully prevail with the 
intentions that have made the United States a leader in the world in the field of human 
rights." 
Roger 
Baldwin 459 
71 "Ratification of these treaties will sustain that momentum by opening up new forums for United States human rights efforts." 
Jimmy 
Carter 464 
72 
"It will also remove a troubling complication from our diplomacy. Regimes with whom we 
raise human rights concerns will no longer be able to blunt the force of our approaches or 
question the seriousness of our commitment by pointing to our failure to ratify." 
Jimmy 
Carter 464 
73 
"More importantly, this nation, with its rich heritage of struggle to realize human rights more 
fully for all its people and with an unmatched record of accomplishments, has a great deal 
to contribute to that process of interpretation and application." 
Jimmy 
Carter 464 
74 
"Ratification of the treaties under consideration, and of other documents implementing 
human rights standards, would ensure United States participation in the review procedures 
they establish: some of the most important forums for human rights issues." 
Edward 
Snyder 465 
75 "It would also place representatives of this country in a better position to challenge states with questionable records." 
Edward 
Snyder 465 
76 
"If the United States intends to maintain and strengthen its credibility in raising its voice 
about the observance of human rights law and practices within the international community 
and if the United States is to continue to provide world leadership in this area, then 
ratification of the treaties under consideration is essential." 
Laszlo 
Iranyi 468 
77 "United States adherence to the Human Rights Treaties will establish creditability for its foreign policy vis-a-vis the guarantee of personal liberty and security for all individuals." AAUW 474 
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"In addition to invalidating charges against the United States of inconsistent and/or 
hypocritical foreign policy tentative, the United States can legitimately support the people 
of the world in their efforts to establish basic human rights." 
AAUW 474 
79 "The United States could do so [promote human rights] without exposing itself to charges of violation the sovereignty of sister-states through intervention in their domestic affairs." AAUW 474 
80 
"The United States has a major role to play in world affairs in setting a legal and moral 
tone in human rights. A look at the list of our Western allies which have ratified and at the 
states of the Communist bloc which have also ratified the treaties leads logically to the 
embarrassing question of why we are not included among the Party States." 
James E. 
Wood, Jr 482 
81 "Ratification is essential to our credibility as a nation." James E. Wood, Jr 482 
82 "U.S. ratification would encourage other countries to ratify and thereby augment the effectiveness of the international human rights systems." 
Edna 
McCallion 491 
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1 "Unless the United States is a party to these treaties, we will be unable to contribute fully to this evolving international law of human rights." 
Warren 
Christopher 28 
2 
"...because it has not ratified these treaties, the United States cannot participate in the 
work of these implementing bodies. The United States does not review the reports 
submitted by states parties on their compliance with the treaties and it does not have a 
voice in their interpretation, interpretations which affect the course of the law of human 
rights for decades to come." 
Patricia Derian 42 
3 "But why must we rigidly evade the views of other Hemispheric governments where we can invoke as a justification nothing more impressive than neglect?" Thomas Farer 108 
4 "Someone will ask, 'Why are you criticizing our sensitivity about external evaluation of our behavior when you reflect the same kinds of sensitivity?'" Thomas Farer 110 
5 
"From a foreign policy standpoint, if we, as a national policy, are urging the protection of 
human rights throughout the world, it simply is hypocritical for us to urge those standards 
for others, and for ourselves not to agree to the international documents or participate in 
the international enforcement mechanism which endeavor to promote those standards." 
Norman Redlich 259 
6 "We believe that it inhibits our own strength in the world, that it inhibits the sincerity of our arguments if we refuse to participate and refuse to ratify these treaties." Norman Redlich 260 
7 "By not being part of the process, we are precluded from calling other countries to task for violations of standards to which we long have adhered." Norman Redlich 260 
8 
"U.S. law restricts foreign aid to governments exhibiting a consistent pattern of violations 
of "internationally recognized human rights." Can we justify these restrictions when the 
United States itself refuses to be bound by the agreements which give the term "human 
rights" its most authoritative legal meaning?" 
John Carey 268 
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9 
"The second point has been talked about before and is pretty self-evident, that is that we 
will be subject to a considerable amount of criticism in the international community and at 
Helsinki follow-up conferences because of the failure to ratify." 
Morton Skylar 272 
10 
"The ability of our own values to survive is damaged when these values are not observed 
by other governments. But we are in a very poor position to press for these values abroad, 
to alert countries of their violations and to suggest improvements so long as we ourselves 
are seen to be in basic noncompliance." 
Morton Skylar 272 
11 
"Every American loses when a citizen of another country faces repression and a loss of 
human rights. We lose because we see human dignity trampled in the dust, and a part of 
us is buried in the process. We lose because our ability to maintain the values for 
ourselves ultimately is dependent on the willingness of other nations to support these 
principles in their own right." 
Morton Skylar 272 
12 
"We cannot preserve freedom and human dignity alone. We must be part of a worldwide 
effort and a joint commitment of all nations to be kept to that high mark. We are not fully 
participating in that effort without ratification." 
Morton Skylar 272 
13 
"As a nation, we cannot urge others to support and observe democratic principles when 
we ourselves have failed to take the most symbolic and direct commitment toward 
observance —formal adoption of the basic rights instruments." 
Washington 
Helsinki Watch 
Committee 
274 
14 
"We do a severe injustice to our commitments to the ideals of human rights, and to our 
belief in the value and effectiveness of our system of laws, by shying away from 
participation in international processes aimed at bringing the benefits of a higher level of 
human rights observance to our own people, as well as to citizens of other countries." 
Washington 
Helsinki Watch 
Committee 
275 
15 
"…we undermine our credibility, and offer a legitimate basis for criticism, when we refuse 
to take even the first step of submitting the necessary assurance of our willingness to 
adhere to minimum standards of human rights." 
Washington 
Helsinki Watch 
Committee 
276 
16 
"The United States in recent years has asserted a position of leadership for human rights 
in the global community. Our unwillingness thus far to ratify the major international human 
lights agreements, however, impairs our ability effectively to exercise this role." 
Harry Inman 278 
17 
"The Inter-American Court, established pursuant to the American Convention on Human 
Rights, recently was established in Costa Rica. Again, the United States was unable to 
participate in the nomination or election of judges because we have not yet ratified that 
Convention." 
Harry Inman 278 
18 
"…the United States is depriving itself of the opportunity to shape the international human 
rights law of the future, and may be relinquishing that role to nations whose commitment to 
human rights is not always borne out by practice." 
Harry Inman 278 
19 
"Taking a stand against human rights violations in other countries as the United States has 
done also demonstrates a sense of national responsibility and moral courage. The United 
States cannot fully pride itself on these acts, however, as our failure to commit ourselves 
to human rights in the international arena undermines our protests and interferes with our 
credibility." 
Harry Inman 278 
20 
"This is a particular mistake in the context of the OAS. The unwillingness of the United 
States to submit itself to the court's jurisdiction will be viewed by many nations as further 
proof that the United States sees human rights as an instrument for political intervention 
Thomas 
Buergenthal 340 
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and that it is unwilling to submit its own domestic institutions to impartial international 
judicial scrutiny." 
21 
"American courts and judges have more experience than those of any other country in the 
Americas in dealing with human rights cases. They have a great and important 
contribution to make to the development of hemispheric human rights law, a law which 
U.S. courts, more than any others, would be able to infuse with the libertarian tradition of 
Anglo-American law." 
Thomas 
Buergenthal 340 
22 
"As a judge on the Inter-American court, I and, I am sure, my colleagues as well will feel a 
genuine loss at not being able to see how American courts interpreted this or that 
provision of the convention before we have to apply it." 
Thomas 
Buergenthal 340 
23 
"…the Court will not be the only loser; but will also be a great loss for the United States, 
for it will deprive the United States of the opportunity to play an important role in the 
hemispheric lawmaking process in which U.S. conceptions of justice and fairness should, 
and need to be taken into account." 
Thomas 
Buergenthal 340 
24 
"…by remaining outside the growing group of states adhering to the American Convention, 
the U.S. increasingly risks being viewed as a nation that either never shared or no longer 
shares a commitment to Hemispheric democratization and solidarity." 
Thomas 
Buergenthal 342 
25 
"As the leading democratic power in the OAS, the U.S. simply cannot afford to isolate itself 
from the Organization's only institutional effort giving credence to the lofty principles which 
the U.S. has for some years now sought to get the OAS and its Member States to put into 
practice." 
Thomas 
Buergenthal 342 
26 
"When the United States participates in the various meetings of human rights bodies, 
agencies and organizations of the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations, the 
question invariably is asked, why does the United States not ratify these treaties. 
Unfortunately, there really is no satisfactory answer." 
Jerome 
Shestack 351 
27 
"It also is important, as I think Professor Lillich and others have mentioned here, that the 
United States play a role in the development of the procedures under the Human Rights 
Committee and the interpretation of the various covenants in working out implementing 
procedures and interpretations. The United States is hampered, indeed restrained, from 
that role by nonratification." 
Jerome 
Shestack 351 
28 
"It [the absence of American ratification] affects it [our relationships with the nations of the 
Organization of American States] very seriously, Mr. Chairman, and in a variety of ways... I 
found the United States in large measure paralyzed and not being able to promote its own 
human rights policy because of its nonratification." 
Thomas 
Buergenthal 361 
29 "Our failure to ratify is seen as evidence of the fact that we have something to be afraid of, that we tell others to do things that we ourselves are unwilling to do." 
Thomas 
Buergenthal 361 
30 
"I am convinced that Americans on any human rights committee or tribunal would be much 
more effective in these bodies if they did not have to continuously explain why the United 
States has not ratified these treaties." 
Thomas 
Buergenthal 361 
31 
"Aside from being recognized as a powerful leader among nations, the United States has 
been identified as the champion of human rights. With greater frequency, however, we are 
finding ourselves being criticized for our position with regard to these treaties." 
Donald McHenry 407 
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32 
"…branded as hypocrites not only by the Soviet Union and its followers, but also by 
otherwise moderate nations which cannot comprehend our failure or refusal to ratify the 
important basic international instruments aimed at protecting human rights." 
Donald McHenry 407 
33 "I believe our continued nonratification is detrimental to vital U.S. national interests." Donald McHenry 407 
34 
"Failure to ratify the treaties is inconsistent with and impedes our efforts in the United 
Nations and bilaterally to promote human rights throughout the world. Our representatives 
to the United Nations and other international fora frequently are criticized, as is the case in 
the current United Nations General Assembly, for espousing human rights for others while 
the United States refuses to undertake binding international commitments with respect to 
the human rights of its own citizens." 
Donald McHenry 407 
35 
"…it has become increasingly difficult for the United States in good conscience and with 
credibility to call forth and hold accountable before the international community notorious 
human rights abusers." 
Donald McHenry 407 
36 
"…to halt the serious erosion of U.S. credibility and influence in this area, the ratification of 
these treaties must be done at the earliest opportunity. The act of ratification is important 
to our credibility as a country devoted to the promotion of human rights." 
Donald McHenry 407 
37 "Criticism or public denunciation of noncompliance and of flagrant violations inevitably lack credibility if the United States itself has failed to ratify these basic human rights treaties." Sidney Liskofsky 411 
38 "…the people who are working to protect human rights around the world regard U.S. nonratification as 'incredible, incomprehensible, and shameful.'" David Hinkley 430 
39 
"When we intervene in any particular human rights situation where there has been a 
pattern of violations of human rights... —no matter what form our intervention takes, we 
always are confronted in the first instance with the question of whether or not we are 
unlawfully and illegally interfering with the internal affairs of a given country or state." 
William Butler 456 
40 
"…you can imagine how embarrassing it might be for an American to continue to be 
effective when his country has failed to join other great nations, such as Canada, England, 
and the Soviet Union, in ratifying these international instruments, which have been 
accepted by the great majority of the world as the norm and standard in the international 
human rights held." 
William Butler 456 
41 
"I am convinced that unless we ratify these treaties, it will be impossible for the United 
States to pursue a credible, persuasive, and constructive human rights policy. We cannot 
continue to denounce other nations for their own noncompliance with international 
standards which the United States itself has not accepted." 
William Butler 456 
42 
"…in the public debate, time and time again the United States is charged with hypocrisy, 
with talking out of both sides of its mouth, with being concerned with the rights of others 
only when it suits the purposes of the United States." 
William Butler 456 
43 
"The comment is, well, you have not even ratified these instruments, you have not even 
subscribed to their principles, so how can you come in here and take these positions on 
behalf of the American position." 
William Butler 457 
44 "The United States, until it becomes a party, is unable to participate in this process. Our absence increases the likelihood of interpretations with which we might disagree." Jimmy Carter 464 
45 "The United States cannot expect to be taken as seriously as all of us would wish in its efforts on behalf of human rights around the world until it becomes an active participant in Edward Snyder 465 
TILLOTSON 
96 
Quote 
No. 
Statement Actor Page 
# 
the various human rights treaties. Our role as a world leader in this field is too open to 
misunderstanding and to the charge of hypocrisy while these documents remain unratified 
by the Senate." 
46 
"In addition to invalidating charges against the United States of inconsistent and/or 
hypocritical foreign policy tentative, the United States can legitimately support the people 
of the world in their efforts to establish basic human rights." 
AAUW 474 
47 
"Without ratification the United States is without legitimate access to that machinery. The 
absence of the United States from the... Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
restrain us from exercising meaningful world leadership in human rights." 
AAUW 474 
48 
"It is imperative that the United States take a strong role in human rights questions 
throughout the world. Until it ratifies these treaties, its statements and actions are impaired 
and can be questioned for sincerity." 
AAUW 475 
49 "Until it ratifies these treaties, the United States can have no authentic or genuine leadership. It is damaging and counterproductive to withhold ratification any longer." AAUW 475 
 
 
H1.b.i:  
 
Quote 
No. Statement Actor 
Page 
# 
1 
"...it is said that the treaties are objectionable because, to the extent that they would call upon 
the United States to observe higher human rights standards than are provided by our domestic 
law, they improperly intrude into an area which should be left to domestic legislation." 
Roberts 
Owen 35 
2 "...in some instances, the treaties might be read as requiring changes in the laws of our several States and, thus, tend to upset the Federal-State balance." 
Roberts 
Owen 35 
3 
"...it is said that the human rights treaties could serve to change our laws as they are, allowing 
individuals in courts of law to invoke the treaty terms where inconsistent with domestic law or 
even with the Constitution." 
Roberts 
Owen 38 
4 "...treaties could be used to alter the jurisdictional balance between our federal and state institutions." 
Roberts 
Owen 38 
5 "...the relationship between a government and its citizens is not a proper subject for the treaty-making powers at all, but ought to be left entirely to domestic legislative processes." 
Roberts 
Owen 38 
6 "Isolationists and opponents of the United Nations viewed the Covenants and other international treaties as attempts to interfere in the domestic legislative process." 
Claiborne 
Pell 72 
7 
"It says that unless the reservation is an integral part of the treaty, which obviously is not 
because then it would be an amendment, then the judiciary would not be bound under the 
supremacy clause." 
Claiborne 
Pell 91 
8 
"I am confident that if they had not felt constrained by a long tradition of senatorial 
obstructionism, they would not have proposed this almost illusory form of ratification. To avoid 
endless debate over every provision that may require some change in U.S. law or practice, they 
have ground the convention into a perfect facsimile of our status quo." 
Thomas 
Farer 105 
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9 
"But if the reluctance to act, reflected in the Senate's deliberate pace, rests on some hidden 
sense of guilt or some primitive nationalist reluctance to concede the propriety of international 
concern, it rests on illusory grounds. The simple reality is that ratification of this Convention will 
not add substantially to the international obligations already assumed by the United States." 
Thomas 
Farer 107 
10 "…we tend to react instinctively with some belligerence to the idea that other countries and peoples can assess for themselves what we are doing…” 
Thomas 
Farer 111 
11 "…it is simply part of the general feeling that the United States knows better about various things and therefore should not be subject to other peoples' judgments.” 
Louis 
Sohn 111 
12 
"I think on the one hand we always say to everybody else that our standards are higher than 
those of anyone else; but we will discover, if we are subject to international supervision, that 
there are some skeletons in our closet and they will be paraded in public, and we do not like that 
idea.” 
Louis 
Sohn 112 
13 
"Second, the treaties imperil or restrict existing rights of Americans by using treaty law to restrict 
or reduce U.S. constitutional rights, to change U.S. domestic Federal or State laws, and to upset 
the balance of power within our unique system of federalism." 
Phyllis 
Schlafly 113 
14 "Even if all those addenda were binding, they would not safeguard the rights of Americans from most of the dangers posed by the treaties." 
Phyllis 
Schlafly 113 
15 "We know that treaties pose much more of a hazard to Americans than to any other nation because of the preeminence of treaties in our system of government." 
Phyllis 
Schlafly 113 
16 
"It is obvious from the texts of the international treaties on human rights, as well as from the 
State Department's recommendations of reservations, statements of understanding, and 
declarations, that the treaties are incompatible with the United States Constitution, would 
override precious American rights, would interfere with our domestic law and matters of private 
concern, and would upset the distribution of power in our system of federalism." 
 
Phyllis 
Schlafly 113 
17 
"Now the question is whether the treaty would be self-executing on domestic law. I think it is 
very clear from the whole tenor of the many witnesses this morning that they do want the 
treaties to change American law, and that they do believe the treaties will change American law, 
and that they do support the pre-eminence of treaties in our constitutional system." 
Phyllis 
Schlafly 131 
18 
"Mrs. Schlafly, I have read your statement with interest and admiration. I take it that you are 
concerned about the vagueness of some of these provisions which invite interpretations 
potentially adverse to the sovereignty of this country." 
Senator 
Helms 136 
19 
"I think, traditionally, that people have viewed the signing of any treaty as a relinquishment of 
sovereignty over our own actions, because we would agree to abide by certain rules and 
regulations, by certain standards in treaties." 
George 
Miller 145 
20 "I think the Senate always has had a conservative voice which suggests that anything like this is a relinquishing of our sovereignty." 
George 
Miller 145 
21 
"I believe similarly that the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American 
Convention are open to constitutional objections, but on different grounds —on the ground that 
they invade the right of the States, under article I section 2 and the 17th amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, to determine the qualifications of voters for Senators and Representatives." 
Philip 
Anderegg 176 
22 "The fact that racial discrimination, poverty, ill health, and crime exist everywhere in the world and that the American people quite properly are interested in those afflictions upon the human 
Philip 
Anderegg 177 
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condition abroad as well as at home does not put the making of U.S. law on them within the 
treaty power." 
23 "I think is likely to be used, to destroy the legislative power of Congress and the power of the States." 
Philip 
Anderegg 178 
24 
"Those who cannot obtain what they want from the legislatures have turned to the courts and 
they are turning to the United Nations and the Organization of American States where these 
treaties come from, bodies which I submit to be hostile to the United States, hostile to the notion 
of federalism, and hostile to the concept of a government of limited powers." 
Philip 
Anderegg 179 
25 "Treaty text itself contains equivalent of pernicious federal-state clause above referred to. Unpredictable scope if treaty should be held to be self-executing." 
Philip 
Anderegg 180 
26 "…there are some who are worried that by ratifying these treaties we would submit ourselves to improper international scrutiny" 
Claiborne 
Pell 255 
27 "We seem afraid to be criticized for the remaining deficiencies that we do have, and so we shy away from participation." 
Morton 
Skylar 272 
28 "…there are some fears expressed by people in the United States that by ratifying these treaties we would submit to improper and unnecessary international scrutiny." Zorinsky 361 
29 
"I think one of the barriers to the ratification of human rights treaties has been that we are afraid 
to have those myths attacked not only internally but also in an international scene. In the past, 
arguments have been offered that we would have to submit ourselves to the judgment of others 
who are our enemies." 
William 
Wipfler 427 
 
 
H1.b.ii: 
Quote 
No. 
Statement Actor Page 
# 
1 "…our contribution to the international cause of human rights will be to set a shining example of our own great respect for human rights." 
Phyllis 
Schlafly 113 
2 
"Our first responsibility is to maintain our high standard of leadership in human rights, and I 
believe it would be a default of this responsibility to pass the buck to committees of nations 
which are clearly our inferiors in respect for human rights. Example, not words, is the best 
teacher.” 
Phyllis 
Schlafly 113 
3 
"I do believe that ratification of these covenants would be an exercise in folly, futility, and 
frustration. We would gain nothing. We would have better guarantees in this country and have 
better relations with other lands if we would reject them, in toto." 
Phyllis 
Schlafly 113 
4 
"…it is most unwise, as I repeatedly have heard suggested, that the United States should ratify 
the treaties as a gesture or an act of encouragement to other countries. I believe it is manifest 
that the gesture will be futile." 
Philip 
Anderegg 237 
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H2.ii: 
 
Quote 
No. 
Statement Actor Page 
# 
1 
"Article 4 (Right to Life) is probably the most troublesome article in the Convention and a U.S. 
reservation with respect to portions of the Article will very likely be necessary because of its 
restrictions on the death penalty and on abortion" 
ABA 
statement 253 
 
H2.iii: 
 
Quote 
No. 
Statement Actor Page 
# 
1 
"But in this particular case, I am informed from the notes of my staff, it was maintained that a 
reservation to a treaty must constitute an integral part of that treaty in order for the judiciary to be 
bound. In other words, a purely domestic statement, which is what all of these reservations are, 
attached to the treaty, is not part of the treaty contract and therefore has no international effect. 
So therefore, the declaration that a treaty is non-self-executing may be invalid. What is wrong 
with that line of reasoning if the basic premise is correct, and presumably it is?” 
Claiborne 
Pell 88 
2 
"It says that unless the reservation is an integral part of the treaty, which obviously is not 
because then it would be an amendment, then the judiciary would not be bound under the 
supremacy clause." 
Claiborne 
Pell 91 
3 "Even if all those addenda were binding, they would not safeguard the rights of Americans from most of the dangers posed by the treaties." 
Phyllis 
Schlafly 113 
4 
"The statements of understanding and declarations have no international standing or validity of 
any kind. Those are mere words, placebos designed to deceive the Senate and the American 
people into thinking our rights have not been interfered with, when in fact they have been 
severely prejudiced or overridden." 
Phyllis 
Schlafly 122 
 
H2.iv: 
 
Quote 
No. 
Statement Actor Page 
# 
1 
"Articles 1.1 and 23.1.b; 1.1 and 23.1.c; and 5.2 of the American Convention raise respectively 
essentially the same issues concerning the qualifications of voters, access to civil service, and 
corporal punishment as have been just discussed in connection with the CP covenant." 
Philip 
Anderegg 185 
2 
"The American Convention (Art. 13, 14, 15 and 16) permits broad exceptions to the rights of 
assembly and association and permits government censorship and punishment of expression 
which would be entirely inconsistent with the American Constitution." 
Norman 
Redlich 264 
3 
"The American Convention (Art. 13, 14, 15 and 16) permits broad exceptions to the rights of 
assembly and association and permits government censorship and punishment of expression 
which would be entirely inconsistent with the American Constitution." 
Norman 
Redlich 264 
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H3.i: 
 
Quote 
No. 
Statement Actor Page 
# 
1 "In the 1950's, some claimed that multilateral human rights treaties would infringe upon the powers and rights of the states in the federal system." 
Claiborne 
Pell 72 
2 
"In 1954, a Constitutional amendment proposed by former Ohio Senator John V. Bricker which 
would have prevented the U.S. Government from entering in to any international agreement that 
might infringe on the powers of the. states or be self-executing (i.e. enforceable by the courts 
without implementing legislation) was defeated in the Senate by one vote. In order to ensure the 
amendment's defeat, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was forced to pledge that the United 
States did "not intend to become a party to any such covenant or present it as a treaty for 
consideration by the Senate." The Dulles Doctrine, as it became known, remained in effect 
throughout the next two decades."" 
Claiborne 
Pell 72 
3 "I think the concern started back in the early 1950's with the notion that Americans would be somehow tried before foreign tribunals." Schachter 111 
4 "Second, we should remember the concern in that period over States' rights, relating especially to race relations. However, Federal civil rights legislation has now rendered this issue obsolete." Schacter 111 
5 "Lingering memories of Bricker have a great deal to do, I think, with fears of the sort we have heard today, that the human rights conventions might require us to do "something terrible." 
Covey 
Oliver 129 
6 
"We have come a long way since the days of Senator Bricker when, in 1954, the so-called 
Bricker amendment failed to pass the Senate by only one vote. This amendment would have 
forbidden the United States from entering into any international agreements which might infringe 
on the powers of States, which might be applied by Federal courts without implementing 
legislation" 
William 
Butler 457 
7 
"The outcome of the Bricker argument made perfectly clear that there would be no conflict 
between the Constitution and these treaties and that any reservations necessary would take 
care of any conflict between our law and the law of the treaties." 
Roger 
Baldwin 459 
 
H3.ii: 
 
Quote 
No. Statement Actor 
Page 
# 
1 
"...it is said that the treaties are objectionable because, to the extent that they would call upon 
the United States to observe higher human rights standards than are provided by our domestic 
law, they improperly intrude into an area which should be left to domestic legislation." 
Roberts 
Owen 35 
2 "...in some instances, the treaties might be read as requiring changes in the laws of our several States and, thus, tend to upset the Federal-State balance." 
Roberts 
Owen 35 
3 
"...it is said that the human rights treaties could serve to change our laws as they are, allowing 
individuals in courts of law to invoke the treaty terms where inconsistent with domestic law or 
even with the Constitution." 
Roberts 
Owen 38 
4 "...treaties could be used to alter the jurisdictional balance between our federal and state institutions." 
Roberts 
Owen 38 
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Quote 
No. 
Statement Actor Page 
# 
5 "...the relationship between a government and its citizens is not a proper subject for the treaty-making powers at all, but ought to be left entirely to domestic legislative processes." 
Roberts 
Owen 38 
6 
"It is our judgment that the prospects for securing that ratification would be significantly and 
perhaps decisively advanced if it were to be clear that, by adopting these treaties, the United 
States would not automatically be bringing about changes in its internal law without the 
legislative concurrence of the federal or state government." 
Roberts 
Owen 40 
7 "We are sensitive to the possibility that we might be further "federalizing" areas of domestic law by making them the subject of an international agreement." 
Jack 
Goldklang 49 
8 "Isolationists and opponents of the United Nations viewed the Covenants and other international treaties as attempts to interfere in the domestic legislative process." 
Claiborne 
Pell 72 
9 
"But in this particular case, I am informed from the notes of my staff, it was maintained that a 
reservation to a treaty must constitute an integral part of that treaty in order for the judiciary to 
be bound. In other words, a purely domestic statement, which is what all of these reservations 
are, attached to the treaty, is not part of the treaty contract and therefore has no international 
effect. So therefore, the declaration that a treaty is non-self-executing may be invalid. What is 
wrong with that line of reasoning if the basic premise is correct, and presumably it is?” 
Claiborne 
Pell 88 
10 
"It says that unless the reservation is an integral part of the treaty, which obviously is not 
because then it would be an amendment, then the judiciary would not be bound under the 
supremacy clause." 
Claiborne 
Pell 91 
11 "…we tend to react instinctively with some belligerence to the idea that other countries and peoples can assess for themselves what we are doing.” 
Thomas 
Farer 111 
12 
"Second, the treaties imperil or restrict existing rights of Americans by using treaty law to restrict 
or reduce U.S. constitutional rights, to change U.S. domestic Federal or State laws, and to 
upset the balance of power within our unique system of federalism." 
Phyllis 
Schlafly 113 
13 "Even if all those addenda were binding, they would not safeguard the rights of Americans from most of the dangers posed by the treaties." 
Phyllis 
Schlafly 113 
14 
"Fifth, the effect of nonratification of the treaties would be to pro claim to the world that we will 
not imperil the sacred rights of American citizens for the sake of negotiations with any foreign 
country, and that our contribution to the international cause of human rights will be to set a 
shining example of our own great respect for human rights." 
Phyllis 
Schlafly 113 
15 "We know that treaties pose much more of a hazard to Americans than to any other nation because of the preeminence of treaties in our system of government." 
Phyllis 
Schlafly 113 
16 
"It is obvious from the texts of the international treaties on human rights, as well as from the 
State Department's recommendations of reservations, statements of understanding, and 
declarations, that the treaties are incompatible with the United States Constitution, would 
override precious American rights, would interfere with our domestic law and matters of private 
concern, and would upset the distribution of power in our system of federalism." 
Phyllis 
Schlafly 113 
17 
"Now the question is whether the treaty would be self-executing on domestic law. I think it is 
very clear from the whole tenor of the many witnesses this morning that they do want the 
treaties to change American law, and that they do believe the treaties will change American law, 
and that they do support the pre-eminence of treaties in our constitutional system." 
Phyllis 
Schlafly 131 
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Quote 
No. 
Statement Actor Page 
# 
18 
"I think, traditionally, that people have viewed the signing of any treaty as a relinquishment of 
sovereignty over our own actions, because we would agree to abide by certain rules and 
regulations, by certain standards in treaties." 
George 
Miller 145 
19 "I think the Senate always has had a conservative voice which suggests that anything like this is a relinquishing of our sovereignty." 
George 
Miller 145 
20 
"I believe similarly that the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American 
Convention are open to constitutional objections, but on different grounds —on the ground that 
they invade the right of the States, under article I section 2 and the 17th amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, to determine the qualifications of voters for Senators and Representatives." 
Philip 
Anderegg 176 
21 "I think is likely to be used, to destroy the legislative power of Congress and the power of the States." 
Philip 
Anderegg 178 
22 
"Those who cannot obtain what they want from the legislatures have turned to the courts and 
they are turning to the United Nations and the Organization of American States where these 
treaties come from, bodies which I submit to be hostile to the United States, hostile to the notion 
of federalism, and hostile to the concept of a government of limited powers." 
Philip 
Anderegg 179 
23 "Treaty text itself contains equivalent of pernicious federal-state clause above referred to. Unpredictable scope if treaty should be held to be self-executing." 
Philip 
Anderegg 180 
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TILLOTSON 
104 
Thomas Buergenthal: Professor at University of Texas Law School and judge on the Inter-
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D. Supplementary Statements 
 
Statements claiming the American Conventions (or treaties at large) are 
consistent with U.S. domestic law 
Quote 
No. Statement Actor 
Page 
# 
1 "We have before us now two covenants and two conventions which, for the first time, give broad international sanction and support to these traditional American policies." Charles Yost 13 
2 
"Finally, there are reservations, understandings, and declarations which the President 
proposes be included in our ratification and which would relieve us from any obligation which 
could conceivably be considered inconsistent with our Constitutions or domestic legislation." 
Charles Yost 14 
3 "These four treaties, in essence, embody what our Government long has done." Arthur Goldberg 20 
4 "More importantly, the substance of the provisions of these four treaties are entirely consistent with the letter and spirit of the United States Constitution and laws." 
Arthur 
Goldberg 22 
5 "In essence, the treaties create an international commitment to the same basic human rights that already are guaranteed to citizens of the United States by our laws and Constitution." 
Warren 
Christopher 28 
6 "U.S. ratification would not endanger any rights that we currently enjoy." Warren Christopher 28 
7 "Let me begin by emphasizing that the substantive provisions of these four treaties do not conflict in any way with basic U.S. law or policy." 
Roberts 
Owen 33 
8 
"...the American Convention on Human Rights, roughly correspond[s], in terms of 
international law, to the Bill of Rights, which is so firmly entrenched in our Constitution. The 
treaty rights include the right to vote, the right to free expression, the right to freedom of 
religion and association, the right to freedom of movement, and a whole series of procedural 
rights relating to fair trial, representation by counsel, and other fundamental rights so familiar 
to Americans." 
Roberts 
Owen 34 
9 
"The treaties before the Senate express values in which the people of the United States have 
believed for a long time. They give expression to human rights that coincide with our own 
laws and practices." 
Patricia 
Derian 43 
10 "To a large extent they embody ideals that we like to think of as typically American." Jack Goldklang 47 
11 "Generally speaking, we have, in our domestic law the substance of the rights in these treaties." 
Jack 
Goldklang 49 
12 
"In short, then, the Senate has before it a convention drafted with major U.S. participation, 
shaped with an eye to U.S. constitutional sensitivities, brought into force coincident with the 
U.S.-led campaign for widespread ratification, a convention that supposedly codifies the 
moral basis of the anti-Soviet alliance, and a convention which does not in significant 
measure enlarge the international obligations of the United States." 
Thomas 
Farer 104 
13 "But, the Administration can say, in the case of the United States, the disparity between domestic law and the terms of the Convention is very modest." 
Thomas 
Farer 104 
14 "I do not think any of these problems exist with respect to the American Convention. I think this is more in the Western tradition, along the lines of the European Convention." 
Walter 
Landry 248 
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Quote 
No. 
Statement Actor Page 
# 
15 
"…think the American Convention is more in the Western tradition, and if the Senate is to 
give priority in ratifying any of these treaties, I would urge it to give that priority to giving its 
advice and consent to ratifying the American Convention." 
Walter 
Landry 249 
16 "There are few instances, very few, in which the treaties do set a higher standard than we have under American law." 
Norman 
Redlich 260 
17 
"…these human rights treaties which you are considering are not other people's laws. They 
are our own laws. We played the largest part in shaping them and we stand the most to gain 
by their observance." 
Morton 
Skylar 273 
18 
"I see nothing in these treaties, perhaps with a few exceptions, that is any different from what 
we have in our Declaration of Independence, Constitution, Bill of Rights and most Federal 
and State laws." 
Harry Inman 277 
19 
"…the catalog of rights the Convention proclaims mirrors, for the most part, traditional 
Western democratic conceptions of civil and political liberties found in our own Bill of Rights 
and the laws giving effect to it." 
Thomas 
Buergenthal 341 
20 
"…these covenants represent the deepest commitments of the United States to the 
safeguards of civil rights and civil liberties found in our Constitution and particularly in our Bill 
of Rights. Therefore, it would seem only natural to have the United States ratify them." 
Jerome 
Shestack 350 
21 
"In support of ratification, we are testifying to affirm the rights guaranteed by these 
international covenants, recognizing that the guarantees of the U.S. Constitution secure, and 
in some cases exceed, some of the rights contained in these human rights covenants." 
John Houck 418 
22 
"…the old chestnuts which have been used as arguments against these treaties have been 
removed. I will not go into that because I think you have had ample testimony to show that 
there is no interference with States rights, nor is there any inconsistency with domestic law." 
William Butler 457 
23 "…the Convention on Racism and the American Convention on Human Rights echo our own constitutional guarantees of equality and fair treatment." 
Douglas 
Fraser 471 
24 
"Some also claim the treaties would undermine U.S. sovereignty. But what the treaties have 
in fact done is universalize principles in our own Constitution and Declaration of 
Independence, and demand their recognition by all nations of the world." 
Douglas 
Fraser 471 
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Statements claiming that the reservations, declarations, and understandings 
recommended by the State Department are too excessive 
Quote 
No. 
Statement Actor Page 
# 
1 
"Frankly, I think that some of them may go farther than is really necessary, but if it is helpful in 
procuring ratification, I would certainly think it was worth accepting them." 
Charles 
Yost 15 
2 
“I think it really is a shame that the State Department and the Department of Justice felt it 
necessary to approach the problem of reservations as they did, instead of as Professor 
Henkin suggests.” 
Frank 
Newman 243 
3 
"I am concerned about some of the reservations that have been suggested by the 
Department of State with respect to the American Convention. The Department wants to 
reserve to the principle of prior censorship, so we would make a reservation that we could 
have prior censorship in the United States. In effect, we would be encouraging other countries 
in the hemisphere to exercise prior censorship. I think this is unwise." 
Walter 
Landry 248 
4 
"So, it is only advocacy or propaganda that constitutes an incitement to violence that is 
prohibited by the American Convention. This is clearly the law of the United States under 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, a Supreme Court decision involving the Chicago riot." 
Walter 
Landry 248 
5 
"On the question of it being non-self-executing, this is clearly the statement in domestic legal 
effect of article 2, of the American Convention. I see no necessity for having this reservation 
when it is incorporated in the treaty." 
Walter 
Landry 248 
6 
"We should not weaken its thrust by putting in reservations that say this is just a goal. If we 
cannot adhere to it, have a specific statement of nonadherence. I think this is more honest 
and it gives greater strength to the treaty than to try to reinterpret it as a goal rather than a 
legally enforceable obligation." 
Walter 
Landry 249 
7 
"With regard to enforcement and codification of the treaty, if the treaty is non-self-executing, 
and it clearly states that it is, there is no necessity to have a separate code, to codify the 
treaty separately in our law." 
Walter 
Landry 249 
8 
"No such reservations, understandings or declarations are necessary with respect to the 
American Convention on Human Rights." 
Walter 
Landry 250 
9 
"I also object to a special declaration suggested by the Department of State to the effect that 
the American Convention is non-self -executing when this is already clearly stated in Article 2. 
Domestic Legal Effects of the American Convention." 
Walter 
Landry 250 
10 
"In short, it is neither necessary nor desirable to codify the American Convention into federal 
law as such." 
Walter 
Landry 251 
11 
"As a result of Article 28 Federal Clause of the Convention, the United States Government is 
not obligated to exercise jurisdiction over subject matter over which it would not exercise 
authority in the absence of the Convention." 
Walter 
Landry 251 
12 
"Other reservations regarding federal/state relations are merely unnecessary. Fears of 
infringing upon states’ rights are absolutely unfounded as a treaty can have no effect on the 
constitutionally protected balance of power between state and federal governments. 
Furthermore, the federal government's ability to legislate in the areas covered by these 
treaties has long been in evidence in civil rights legislation passed over the last twenty years." 
Harry 
Inman 278 
13 
"I want to stress the fact that these conventions, with the declarations the President has 
suggested to all four of them, will have no impact or relatively little impact on U.S. domestic 
law." 
Richard 
Lillich 337 
14 
"Respect for federalism is intrinsic to the Inter-American Convention. No generic reservations 
are necessary." AAUW 475 
 
TILLOTSON 
108 
Statements claiming that the reservations, understandings, and declarations 
are sufficient to address any concerns over ratification 
 
 
Quote 
No. Statement Actor 
Page 
# 
1 
"These human rights treaties are the type of treaties where the Senate, in its wisdom, and 
this committee, in recommending them to the Senate, can, by an appropriate 
understanding or reservation, state that the treaties must be interpreted to conform to our 
Constitution and both domestic and international law." 
Arthur 
Goldberg 20 
2 
"In the few instances where it was felt that a provision of the treaties could possibly be 
interpreted to diverge from the requirements of our constitution or from federal or state law 
presently in force, the Administration has suggested that a reservation or understanding be 
made to that provision. In our view, these reservations do not detract from the object and 
purpose of the treaties — that is, to see to it that minimum standards of human rights are 
observed throughout the world — and they permit us to accept the treaties in a form 
consonant with our domestic legal requirements." 
Roberts 
Owen 39 
3 
"...subject to the proposals that we have made, there are not legal obstacles to our 
becoming a party to these treaties." 
Jack 
Goldklang 44 
4 
"It was suggested that because the treaties are not self-executing, we will have a need for 
new legislation. However, we have proposed reservations which, in effect, permit us to rely 
on our existing Constitution and laws. Therefore, if the package that we have 
recommended is accepted, we would not need any new legislation." 
Jack 
Goldklang 47 
5 
"From time to time arguments have been raised that perhaps we ought not adhere to these 
treaties because of some legalism or some supposed inconsistency with the U.S. 
Constitution, and, provided that there is a clear understanding and reservation in those 
areas where there may be inconsistency, we feel that certainly there is no valid reason 
whatsoever not to sign the treaties on that basis." 
John Norton 
Moore 77 
6 
"The Constitution, the State Federal system, and American law will not be altered or 
require any kind of immediate change as a result of the passage of these conventions. It is 
clear that with the understandings, reservations, and declarations that have been 
recommended, they are completely consistent with the U.S. Constitution." 
John Norton 
Moore 91 
7 
"My response is that the reservations now proposed by the Administration, unlike the 
reservations in the Power Authority case, would, if attached by the Senate, constitute an 
integral part of the treaty obligations of the U.S. as these reservations do vary, limit and 
qualify the obligations of the U.S. to comply with the respective provisions of the treaties. 
According to the holding in Power Authority, that would render the reservations here 
proposed legally binding between the United States and other parties to the treaties as a 
matter of general international law." 
John Norton 
Moore 92 
8 
"…the questions that have been discussed in three days of hearings thus far relating to the 
impact of these treaties in the United States are resolvable, and that the United States can, 
if it wishes, ratify these treaties without cost to its domestic legal order and with significant, 
if perhaps modest, benefits." 
John 
Lawrence 
Hargrove 
345 
9 
"…it appears that with the proposed reservations, the provisions of the treaties would be 
consistent with American law." 
Roger 
Baldwin 460 
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Statements in some way negating treaties would intervene in domestic affairs 
 
Quote 
No. 
Statement Actor Page 
# 
1 
"It is the Administration's view that the treaties are, on their face, and according to their 
terms, not self-executing and thus are not enforceable directly by the courts. A Senate 
declaration would simply clarify the intention of the United States in this regard." 
Roberts 
Owen 38 
2 
"The content of this reservation is already built into Article 28 of the American 
Convention. There need be no apprehension that the ratification of the human rights 
treaties will invade the field of those matters which are properly left to states jurisdiction." 
Roberts 
Owen 39 
3 
"If we did not have reservations for these problems, the Constitution still would prevail as 
the law of the United States —this is a very important point to remember —but we would 
be in default as far as our international obligations are concerned." 
Jack 
Goldklang 44 
4 
"Another matter about which you indicated concern in your letter of invitation, is the 
Federal-State relationship. There are some treaties, such as the American Convention 
on Human Rights, which is before you, and the Refugee Protocol, 19 U.S.T. 6223, which 
have built into them a Federal-State clause, so reservations for that kind of treaty are not 
necessary..." 
Jack 
Goldklang 46 
5 
"The Constitution, the State Federal system, and American law will not be altered or 
require any kind of immediate change as a result of the passage of these conventions. It 
is clear that with the understandings, reservations, and declarations that have been 
recommended, they are completely consistent with the U.S. Constitution." 
John Norton 
Moore 91 
6 
"In short, then, the Senate has before it a convention drafted with major U.S. 
participation, shaped with an eye to U.S. constitutional sensitivities, brought into force 
coincident with the U.S.-led campaign for widespread ratification, a convention that 
supposedly codifies the moral basis of the anti-Soviet alliance, and a convention which 
does not in significant measure enlarge the international obligations of the United 
States." 
Thomas 
Farer 104 
7 
"The Constitution prevails over a treaty, according to the best we have from the 
Supreme Court as to governmental action that the Constitution prohibits." Covey Oliver 132 
8 
"The determination of what measures are suitable is a matter for internal decision. The 
Convention does not require enactment of legislation bringing new subject matter within 
the federal ambit." 
Walter 
Landry 251 
9 
"As I see it, there would be no remedy through the American Convention where only 
state jurisdiction is involved and there is no federal question raised." 
Walter 
Landry 251 
10 
"…the American Convention on Human Rights is not inconsistent with U.S. federalism 
and decentralized government and would provide for a limited regional system for the 
protection of human rights in the Western Hemisphere." 
ABA 
statement 251 
11 
"…the American Convention does not obligate the U.S. Government to exercise 
jurisdiction over subject matter over which it would not exercise authority in the absence 
of the Convention." 
ABA 
statement 251 
12 
"There are no fundamental constitutional questions involved in U.S. ratification; a new 
body of law will not lie imposed on our courts: nor will traditional federal-state relations 
be adversely affected to the detriment of the states." 
ABA 
statement 254 
13 
"Ratification of the human rights treaties certainly will strengthen the confidence and 
stature of our nation." Harry Inman 278 
  
TILLOTSON 
110 
14 
"I want to stress the fact that these conventions, with the declarations the President has 
suggested to all four of them, will have no impact or relatively little impact on U.S. 
domestic law." 
Richard Lillich 337 
15 
"Whether or not one agrees with those who insist on the need for a federal-state clause, 
its presence in the American Convention resolves whatever real or imagined 
constitutional obstacles its absence would otherwise pose and thus facilitates U.S. 
adherence to the American Convention." 
Thomas 
Buergenthal 342 
16 
"I did a study on this subject a number of years ago and found that the great fears which 
some people here have about the consequences of making a human rights treaty non-
self-executing are not well-founded." 
Thomas 
Buergenthal 360 
17 
"…the old chestnuts which have been used as arguments against these treaties have 
been removed. I will not go into that because I think you have had ample testimony to 
show that there is no interference with States rights, nor is there any inconsistency with 
domestic law." 
William Butler 457 
18 
"Some also claim the treaties would undermine U.S. sovereignty. But what the treaties 
have in fact done is universalize principles in our own Constitution and Declaration of 
Independence, and demand their recognition by all nations of the world." 
Douglas Fraser 471 
 
Statements claiming desire for the U.S. to submit itself to what might be 
considered “intervention” from the international community 
Quote 
No. 
Statement Actor Page 
# 
1 
"There is no perceived constitutional objection to U.S. acceptance ipso facto of the 
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The non-self-executing nature of 
the treaty and the federal clause designed to protect the integrity of the U.S. federal system 
offer adequate safeguards to U.S. acceptance of the jurisdiction of the court. The question of 
U.S. acceptance of such jurisdiction is really more of a political than a legal question." 
ABA 
statement 253 
2 
"I think eventually we should accept the jurisdiction of the court. Again, I think we should 
move toward a viable, enforceable hemispheric human rights system, such as is present in 
Western Europe." 
Walter 
Landry 258 
3 "I would agree." 
Claiborne 
Pell 259 
4 
"…we hope the Senate will seriously consider approving the voluntary declaration referred to 
in article 62 of the American Convention, by which it would accept the jurisdiction of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights." 
Sidney 
Liskofsky 412 
5 
"The American Convention on Human Rights provides for the first time not only a 
Commission on Human Rights with power, but it provides for a court, which is not yet before 
the Senate, but a court which, like the European Court of Human Rights and other courts in 
other regions of the world, will for the first time give people the right to appeal directly to an 
international authority for a redress of grievances." 
Roger 
Baldwin 459 
6 
"We believe the United States should go further and, pursuant to Article 62, accept 
unconditionally the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights." 
Edward 
Snyder 466 
 
  
LEADER OF RIGHTS? 
111 
Statements made about the American Convention’s Article 4 (Right to Life) 
Quote 
No. 
Statement Actor Page 
# 
1 
"Mr. Chairman, this simply would track the reservation already proposed by the 
administration to article 4 of the American Convention and simply would make abundantly 
clear, perhaps taking a cautious approach here, something which certainly is the intent of 
the administration. It would be perfectly consistent with what we are doing in the American 
Human Rights Convention.” 
John 
Norton 
Moore 
77 
2 
"The American Convention contains some language, both with respect to right to life and 
with respect to capital punishment, to which the Department has felt that a reservation 
indicating that, adherence to those provisions is subject to the Constitution and other laws 
of the United States would be desirable. For example, as you know, Roe v. Wade, decided 
in 1973, as a matter of constitutional law, among other precedents, deals with this 
question." 
John 
Norton 
Moore 
87 
3 
"This American tradition of human rights is reflected throughout many parts of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, but most especially in regard to Article 4. It states, in part: 
'Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law 
and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
life.'" 
Jesse 
Helms 238 
4 
"However, the American Convention on Human Rights addresses this issue left unresolved 
by the Supreme Court. Article 4 clearly provides for legal personhood to extend from the 
moment of conception. Therefore, should the Convention be ratified, I believe it would be 
entirely appropriate for the Supreme Court to reconsider the entire issue of abortion and 
how its past interpretations of the Constitution would be affected by such an international 
recognition of personhood." 
Jesse 
Helms 238 
5 
"I would seriously question whether it would be possible to ratify the American Convention 
on Human Rights were a reservation adopted affecting the right to life outlined by Article 4." 
Jesse 
Helms 239 
6 "Nor should we attempt to interpose U.S. law to nullify Article 4. Right to Life." 
Walter 
Landry 250 
7 
"…we particularly would like to mention article 4 of the American Convention on human life 
which expresses in the original text the position of the Catholic Conference and the Catholic 
Church of the United States." 
Monsignor 
Lally 382 
 
 
